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ELECTIONS CODE SECTION 3523.1: 
Upon the certification of an initiative 
measure for the ballot, the Secretary of State 
shall transmit copies of the initiative 
measure, together with the ballot title as 
prepared by the Attorney General pursuant 
to Section 3530, to the Senate and Assembly. 
Each house shall assign the initiative 
measure to its appropriate committees. The 
appropriate committees shall hold joint 
public hearings on the subject of such measure 
prior to the date of the election at which 
the measure is to be voted upon; provided, 
that no such hearing may be held within 30 
days prior to the date of the election. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed 
as authority for the Legislature to alter 
the initiative measure or prevent it from 
appearing on the ballot. 
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l f st question 
the power to be 
necessary to the 
r to the 
is 
power, 
be an interesting way to begin. 
Thank you. I would just like 
to say s hearing is to establish a 
record. proposition that the voters ll be confronted with 
in June is of great importance in terms of its impact on the body 
politic and certainly on the decision-making process in the 
public sector, and we take it seriously. What we want to do is 
make sure that we have the best possible input that would 
indicate both its impact and its legality and anything else that 
should be made known to the public as they consider this 
initiative on June ballot. 
We have with us members of the Assembly Judiciary 
Committee other Assemb members who have an important 
contribution to make and important responsibilities as related to 
the potentialities of this Gann iat Joining us from the 
Assembly is the Vice-Chair of the Assembly Judiciary Committee, 
Lloyd Connel , Assemblyman ck Johnston, Assembly Republican 
Leader Bob Naylor, Assemb Richard Mountjoy, as well as 
Assemblyman Chuck Calderon. 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: Thank Bion Gregory is our first 
is Counsel of California, a graduate 
and the Hastings College of the Law. He 
served as a slat Counsel from 1968 to 1970. From 
1971 to 1976, he was Ch f Counsel to the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary. He has served as islative Counsel since 1976 
and is current a member of the California Law Revision 
Commission and the Cali Commiss on Uniform State Laws. 
Mr. Gregory. 
Before you in, I ld point out that we discovered 
only yes some ser s shortcomings in the public address 
system. We asked if there were adequate microphones. We were 
told there were more adequate microphones, but 
we were not told, because we d not ask the further question if 
they were working: only four were working. So, we have four 
microphones to among us, it might behoove those of you 
in the back to move fonvard so you can hear us because I am not 
sure we will be successful passing around microphones all 
morning in a manner such that you 11 able to pick up 
everything. So, I will that suggestion to you now, if you 





subdivision (b) , 
statute that 
electors. If 
provision of the new 










Isn't it true that these 
That s correct. 
Reform But 
to govern is a 
houses, i 
Well, 
as those in the 
le times 
are identical to 
cal Reform Act, 
body of law 
deals with. 
distinguish 
ru s of the house? 
MR. Well, rules of the house generally 
govern rna operations of either or both houses of the 
Legislature, whereas the Political Reform Act is a comprehensive 
act that governs a of jects including conflict of 
interest, campaign, exposure ign contributions, reporting 
requirements, a variety of conduct that evolves around elected 
officials and their campaigns whi ses duties on individuals 
other than elected officials. 
amends a 
Legislature --
true that this initiative 
ng the conduct of the 
committees and so on? 
MR. GREGORY: It s is of law that are 
located in Code, formerly were in the 
Political Code prior to the adoption of the Government Code in 
the 1940's. or not those provisions can be construed as 
statutes or merely ru s nf se, I think is another issue. 
were adopted as statutes 
though, s by both houses and signed 
by the Governor? 
MR. GREGORY: At of initial adoption, yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: R 
le delineates various legislative 
powers a ion 9 0 continues existing law insofar 
as it makes of the Assembly responsible for the 
eff ient conduct of the legis ive administrative affairs 
of the Assemb and provides for election of the Speaker at 
the commencement of sess Hovwver, as I will point out in 
connect with scussion of the powers of the Assembly 
Ru s Committee, the powers of r to accomplish the task 












This ha in existi law. 
Subdivis ld restrict the 
of the Rules 
to s chairman 
Speci cal 
s administrative 
officer, or other 
th r sion of 
law r the Chairman nor 
of the Assembly 
Committee on Rules 11 the power 
to perform any action on behalf of the 
committee, ng, but not limited to, 
the making of contracts, the payment of 
claims, the allocation of office space, or 
the hiring or dismissal of staff, without 
the ss zation of two-thirds of 
the total members f the committee. Such 
authorizat shall only to matters 
or matters under consideration. 
This provision 
adopted by the As ly 
Rules Committee Resolut 
provides: 
reverse the practice formerly 
s ttee suant to Assembly 







That it he 









proposi does not 
to appointments made 
assign-
appoint-
s of the 
admi stration 
of other 
provision that makes all 
Speaker of the Assembly 
s vote of the Assembly 
the statutory power 
ssions. This 
provision with respect 
s Committee. 

is imposed even the on a 
proportional basis between larly, Section 9917 
would i the or agent of the Joint 
Ru s ttee from of behalf of the 
committee inc ng, of contracts, 
the payment of c office space, or the 
hiring or dismissal expressed authorization 
of two-thirds of committee. The 
authorizat app matter or matters under 
immediate cons , Joint Rules Committee 
may act an affi vote of a majority of the members 
from each house and nt Rule 40 ssly authorize the 
committee to appoint f officer and give this 
person such duties relating to the administrative, fiscal, and 
business affairs of the committee as the committee may prescribe. 
Article 3 sets forth various provisions relating to 
legislative rules and procedures. Section 9920 would require a 
two-·thirds vote of the membership of the house in question to 
adopt or amend a ru of that house and a two-thirds vote of the 
members present and voting, a quorum being present, to 
temporari suspend a rule of that house. Under present rules, 
the adoption, amendment and su sion generally require only a 
majority vote of each house. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Mr. Chairman? 
CHAIR}1AN KEENE: Yes, Assemblyman Naylor. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Could you tell me what the rules 
were up unt 
had stayed that 
, in your recollection, the rules 
respect to ion of rules? 
MR. GREGORY: I bel of that time the 
Senate of ts rules majority vote and the 
Assembly requi ion a two-thirds vote of those 
present voting, which is less solute two-thirds, but 
it was two-thirds present and voting. 
ASSEMBLY~AN NAYLOR: And that two-thirds 
su ion 




about the Joint 
ru s 
Mr. Chairman, is my 
si ce the inception of the 
vote to su the rules was •.•. what 
MR. GREGORY: I t the Joint Rules. At 
this poi wP are ust talking about the rules of the houses. 





ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: e f is 
same. 
9-
we that, Mr. Mountjoy, as a 
conclusion on your 
all 
ility, from your 
number, perhaps 80 
th t we can put it as 
Counsel, is suggesting 
sent and voti would be 
is establi 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Mr. irman, I a further 
question. 
CHAIP~AN KEENE: Mr. 
J\SSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: , if at the beginning of 
the session new ru s are not , what is the -- what rules 
do the respect houses operate under? 
MR. GREGORY: If new rules are not adopted, then under 
the s of par amentary law, the houses operate 
effect be the sess started as a 
matter of custom and 
ASSEMBLYr.·IAN 
intrans nor ty 
of rules at the beginning of 
would be the continuation of 
parliamentary custom? 
so that if perchance some 
wanted to block the adoption 
, all that would happen 
s rules -- by 
be the result. 
ASSEMBLY~tAN NAYLOR: Thank 
, why don't you proceed with 
your tes 
MR. GREGORY: Sect 9921 would require a two-thirds 
vote of of each se to adopt or amend a joint 
rule, and a two-thirds vote of the se in question to 
temporar ly a joint rule. Historically, adoption and 
amendment of rules have been permitted on a majority 
vote; ry suspens s red a two-thirds vote. 
Section 9922 would require 
except the rules committee be ere 
jurisdiction reof established 
amendment of rule of 
vote of that house 
ional to the 
of each 
Present , the 




re~.pect house In the Senate 
-1 -
all standing committees 
the size and 
the adoption or 
houses by a two-thirds 
would be required to be 
of the house, and members 
their re ive caucuses. 
each house are 
ction thereof are 
ori membership of the 
ttee members are appointed 
caucuses. 
se 
rules. However, in 
or her vote added to 
general cons stent with present 
and re is 
Senate, there is no 
adding a vote. 
As s earlier, 
than a quorum of a s ng 
present to act as an ad hoc 
and then repor~s to the 11 
absent member may have his 
outcome of the vote is not 
add In the 
tching or 
s a common ctice when less 
ttee is present, for the members 
It is not clear whether Section 9925 is 
practice of a vote before a quorum 
the literal language of the sect would 
ich takes testimony 
quorum is present. 
to affect the 
is sent, but, again, 
appear to prohibit that 
prac ce. 
Section 9926 general 
requirements of present Sections 
meetings of the houses and their 
public appropriate notice 
ifies the meeting 
27 and 9028. That is, 
committees must open and 
reof given. Section 9926 does, 
Journal when it should have however, refer to notice 
referred to notice in 
a three-fi vote, ins 
File and, more s ificantly, requires 
of a majori vote to dispense with 
requires only a two-day this notice. Moreover, the 
notice in some circumstances where a notice is presently 
required. 
Section 9927 would i when Assembly or Senate 
or committees thereof may meet in execut session. The section 
is based on sent Section 90291 however, section more 
narrowly limits the circumstances an executive session may 
be held. Specifical , Section 9927 wou no longer permit an 
executive session (l) to cons matters relating to 
appointment, ssal of an loyee; (2) to hear 
complaints or s aga nst an officer, employee, or 
publ off (3) to consider matters re to internal 
house rna (4) to cons of bills to 
committee; or (5) for G con renee to consider 
nonsubstant 







ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: For all 
MR. GREGORY: I can't 
public , as a 





to (inaudible) ... 
, there is authorization 
lie bodies? 
1 state for every 





meeting of a Con 
present or that there 
parties or both 
Report be pri 
Conference 
amendments. 
Finally, deeming a 
as intended, the unde 
enacted would pe 
any statute enacted 
of an open 1 notice meeting 
whether a full 
all members to be 
1 interested 
renee Committee 
ing of what a 
lly a set of 
renee void suggests that, 
is deemed not to have been 
collateral attack on 
SENATOR KEENE: Yes, Mr. Naylor. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Mr. , I find that second 
pa into evidence a misunderstanding the 
initiative and the bias on your part. When we pass bills to the 
floor of the Legislature out of policy committee or Ways and 
Means Committee, is it not true that they're required, even 
though the cornm , to print on the floor for 
two days prior to, that is to be read a second and third time and 
to be in print be we vote on them? That's the current 
procedure. They're in print, ? 
MR. GREGORY: It is requi they be read whether 
or not A second or a third time depends on when 
they're ly amended, but they must be read at least a 
third t you consider them when they come to the floor 
from committee and the bill must be in when the bill is 






And ld a bill not be 
from a Conference Committee 
s added in Conference 
floor votes on that 
Conference , not been adopted. Al.l the 
amendments that are hefore you on the floor of 
the House have been on of the House and, 
therefore, are amendments by the House, and then the 
bill is reprinted after House hns V1hen the Conference 
Report comes to the floor, it has not been adopted at that time. 
The House very well reject it appoint a second Conference 
Committee. So at that t to print 11 with the amendments 
in it would be to lace amendments bill ich have not 




member at a me,~tj ng where the action is taken with knowledge that 
the meeting is held in violation of the meeting 
requirements. 
Section 9929.5 is on present Section 9031, which provides 
express authority an act mandamus, injunction, or 
declaratory relief for the pu ses of ing violations of 
the open meeting law. This sect would provide similar 
expressed authority an action to prevent any violation of any 
provision of Proposition 24. 
Artie IV sets s provisions regarding 
legislative funds and nistrat Section 9°30 continues 
existing law insofar as it prov s for deposit of appropriations 
in respective legislative conti funds and for disbursement 
by the respective Fules Committees. However, Section 9931 would 
require that disbursements from the Senate and the Assembly funds 
be divided proportionately according to the partisan composition 
of the respective houses, or as otherwise provided by a 
two-thirds vote of the membership of the respective Rules 
Committee. Funds in the joint contingent fund would be allowed 
to be dispersed only pursuant to a two-thirds vote of the total 
membership of the Joint Rules Committee. Money appropriated for 
legislative printing would be subject to the same requirements 
for proportionate, partisan disbursement or a two-thirds ·vote. 
There is no present irernent of proportionate disbursement and 
funds are allocated hy their respective Pules Committees by a 
majority vote. 
Section 9934 would require wi 30 days after the 
adoption of the proposition, that funds for support of the 
Legislature ... 
P<.SSFMBLYMAN ~OUNTJOY: May I, may I just •.. 
SENATOR KEENE: Mr. oy. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: The portion on expenditures of 
funds, I , as speaks to the expenditures 
of funds, does not actually require a two-thirds vote of the 
funds. It does require it, however, if the funds cannot enjoy 
the two-thirds vote of the Rules Committee Isn't it true, Bion, 
that what s is funds can be expended by a simple 
majority of that Ru s Committee, however, an equal amount, or a 
like amount, proportionatly would fall to the other side. In 
other words, you could not spend politically money from that fund 
without a two-thirds vote. The simple buying of pencils, the 
simple buying of things of that sort, would simply take a 
two-thirds, a simple maj vote real , and if it did require 
the two-thirds, it could not get the two-thirds, then 
proportionally the funds would have to be spent for the minority 





provision is rely newi , it has been the past practice 
of the respective Rules Committees to contract for an independent 
audit, but the se on of the auditor has never been subject to 
FPPC approval. 
Thjs completes my discussion of newly added 
provisions of the measure. state at outset, the measure 
would also repeal certain provisions, namely Sections 9921 to 
9923 inclusive, of the Government Code, which generally require 
members of the Assemb and staff to assist a Speaker and carry 
out the duties of the Speaker, limit the amount and method of 
payment for performing certain services, and require the payment 
of certain expenses incurred by the Speaker. The repeal of these 
divisions would not appear to work any significant change in the 
law. 
Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I'd be happy 
to respond to any questions the Committee way have. 
SENATOR KEENE: Mr. Harris. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: Yes. Mr. Gregory, could you tell 
me, relative to Sections 9911 and 9922, you don't really need to 
refer to these sections specif).cally to answer my question, what 
would be the impact of those two sections relative to the 
creation of the Assembly Rules Committee and the creation of the 
committees of the house on a third party or an independent? 
Would they effectively be barred from serving on committees or 
serving on the :Rules Committee by virtue of the language and the 
proposition? 
MR. GREGORY: Well, they would certainly be barred from 
serving on s Committee because the Rules Committee 
provisions recognize the two largest parties in the house, and so 
if you were a third or a fourth largest party, you would not be 
able to be any member of the Rules Committee. 
ASSF.~BLYMAN MOUNTJOY: I just ask ... 
Mountjoy. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: Well, let me ask you on that 
question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: It's on that point. It's on that 
very point. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: No, but I'm ing him to answer 
it. 





r:tn inilcpendent in the Legislat:ure, should there be a number 
elected to the Legislature, isn't it under this reform initiative 
allowable t.hot we could amend those rules to allow that? 
Because, after all, s is for p rt 1 representation in 
the house. Js that not al le r the initiative? 
MR. GREGORY: It's two nts. First of all, I think 
that if this is amended, that it would be in furtherance of the 
purposes of the act, and wou be an allowable amendment. 
However, that amendment could not be done by a single house. 
That house would have to have concurrence of another house 
and the signature of the Governor before they could make the 
amendment under the provisions of this act. 
SENATOR WATSON: Maybe on two-thirds or three-fifths? 
MR. GREGOFY: By a two-thirds vote. Also by a 
two-thi s vote o each house and the signature by the Governor. 
ASSEMBLY~lliN MOUNTJOY: Correct. 
~R. GREGORY: Unless you were to submit it back for the 
electors for a vote. 
ASSEMBLY~AN MOUNTJOY: But it is permissible to amend 
the rules a equa representation by an independent party, 
should they be elected to the house? 
MR. GREGORY: I think t.hat that would not be contrary to 
the provisions of the ini ative. 
ASSEI1BLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Okav. The second point is, t.he 
present. vote on nt commi ttel? of rules for expenditures, 
etc., is it not 50 percent of both houses of the Legislature? 
Fifty percent of the Assembly and 50 percent, or majority of the 
Assembly and majori of the Senate? 
MR. GREGORY: It's a majori , majority of the ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Not the majority of the Rules 
Comm ... 
MR. GREGORY: ... other contingent, that's the majority 
of the both ses. 
ASSEMBLY~ffiN MOUNTJOY: Yes. 
MR. GREGORY: There is slightly more than 50 percent. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Yes, it's about 60 percent at the 
present time, as requ n statute today. 
UNIDENTIFIED MEMBER: Mr. Chairman? 
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partisan proport 1 
that someone who's an 
favor of two-




s. So it's such 
then, be able to 
could be a 
So in the Arizona case -- one could 
f was i al together; 
cf it s were brought into 
MR. GREGORY: That's correct. 
SE:NATOR TORHES: The ri of the parties, once 
constitut y r, was the issue before the court, 
not whether or not by even constituting 
themselves as a se types of regulations. 
1'-~R. GREGORY: vJell, 
them. were ing sole 
had nothing like this before 
wi a normal legislative 
environment where the majori had structu the committees in 
such a way that le seats to which they 
and that was the issue. felt that they were led 
So 
these ki o ssues wou 
first time that 
the Baker vs. Carr 





little lJ t 
consti ona 
of the California 
\"Je 'n': not aware of in any other 
ng rect J 
If you were to asked to argue in behalf 
counsel on 
arguments 
s in arguing as 
, what would be 
those s of 1 issues? 
VOICE: G case now. 
We ate fact that there is a 
cogitation involved. 
, my argument on 
at the entire operation 
and the use of the committee system 
for the lation nt of islation and bring to 
the attention of 
Congress, that 





a pe son 
parties a sPa 
they cannot mu 
in Cali a, like the Federal 
extensively in 
and many of the 
the committees of 
slatures, they 
more amendments on 
occurs on floor. And to 
is not a member of onP of the two largest 
the Rules because of the fact that 















in this case, 
ionnl 
would he be able to 




sition 24 the 
chairman, would be 
s Senator Johnson get on a 
s ing 
the committees 
will he sentation of 
each that particular 
number and or to some te a, Senator Johnson, 
who is currently one member of 40-member body representing 
rough two-and-a-half percent of that body, would have to, in 
applying that two-and-a-half rcent figure against the size of 
the committee, a number that would allow that, allow him 
to have one seat on that particu committee. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: So if we had a committee roughly 
composed o 
Johnson 
or more people would Senator 
ttce. 







SENATOR ROBERTI: But we have, as you know, but we have 
wcmu,crs or more. So effectively, Senator 
ing committee either. 
MR. GREGORY: Not s present constituted in number. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: therefore, he cannot sit on the 
cannot sit on any s committee, and he 
rnembe of the Rules except the 
. GREGORY: That's correct. 
ic in the selection of 
any member on a s ng 
Carl he 
tt_ee? 
MR.GREGORY No, because those would be decided by the 
caucuses, 
a preference 
's not a member of, he's lined to state 
either pa 
SENATOR ROBERTI: So there , he ef ively is 
precluc rom even se ing a member on a standing committee. 










I Let me just 
recent 
are all sorts of sensit litica 
campaign contributions, 
disc ~ so on, 
it more workab e to meet 
would an amendment on s. 
issues relating to 
of interest, 
over the years to make 
J don't see why anyone 
SENATOR KEENE: Senato i has a point of order. 
nt of order ... to clarify a point. 
The was before the 
petition was fi of State. Now it may have 
occurred a r you been to your lawyers, which, you know, is 
something nobody else to know ; though, quite 
frankly, it was amendable, had somebody been disposed toward 
protecting independents, wh I don't think the Republicans at 
that tJme wen"'. A change could have been made. The Johnson 
decisio11, and it was made quite independent of this initiative, 
was made before the Secretary of State received the filing, and 
it's quite c to us that there was no change made because it 
was a desire to punish Senator Johnson. 
SENATOR KEENE: Well, it goes beyond the point of order, 
I have to say, ti. l\ssemblyman Naylor, back to you. 
I just want to go over that once 
could, in fact, place on the 
an independent, and at that 
more , e r caucus 
Rules Committee, at their choice, 
point that i would have 
makeup. Is that correct? He wou 
Rules Committee, if he were p 
a voice the committee 
have all the power of that 
this initiat either caucus 
Rules Cnmrnittee a member of an ind 
SENATOR KEENE: I'll give 
Assembl Ass 
had the floor. 
ASS E~·"cBLY~tAN MOUNTJOY 
the 
ASSEMBLYMAN NP..YLOR: Senator 
on the t e a can say is I 
of not done an independent 
in that would be something 
corrected. Then I y]e -- can I mean, 
his point or the w ss respond? 
under the provisions of 
fact, place on the 
ss chance to answer 
the person who 
i may well be correct 
think that the drafting 
or a ird-party member 
that should obviously be 
can Mr. Mountjoy finish 
speaking recogniz 
over to see who was 
the witness an 
opportunity to answer and 
go to Senator Speraw next. 
Mountjoy's question again. 
So 
ze -- and then we'll 
don't you answer Assemblyman 
MR. GREGORY: The members of a caucus could elect 




SPERAW: So un ss 
UNIDENTIFIED 
nature more 1 
ASSEMBLY NAYLOR: Mr Ch 1 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: As N lor and t.hen Assemblyman 
nson 
ASSEJII:BLYMAN NAYLOR: quick int ... 
SENATOR SPER!>W: I'm sorry, one r question of Mr. 
Gregory? 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: Senato 
the floor even though we may not 
mechanism there? We can use the 
choose? 
SENATOR. SPERAW: So the 
as much as some er s s doe 
that a person who may have heen d 
raw. 
that some legislatures 
on the floor. Is it true that 
slature can submit amendments to 
do it often, but isn't the same 
system as much as ltle 
member may submit 
fact that we don't use it that 
not mean it doesn't exist and 
to serve on can still t amendments 
a committee at he wanted 
to effect (inaudible) ... 
MB.. GREGORY: Yes, 
is within r of a member to 












the same or the 
(Inaudible) ... 
gets to 
we amend the b l 
amendments. 
r 
ud le) ... 
But, I brought 
stion, and I think 
pointing out that the 
political 
cs are such that 
and are widely 
on them, that is not the 
s on the 
in numbers and 
say 
you about common 
The is substantially 
is substant lly the same. 
8 
Jn other islatures, 
not even appear print until 
California practice where 










~F. GREGORY: Just 
es that the 
1 law re 
r of tJ·1c 
the 
is a member of the 
l\SSEMRLY~,AN ROBINSON We l s a common 
parliamentary aw says contrary to that includi but it 
is silent. Does i itiat ? 
MR. GREGORY: No, it 




you disagree with the 
r would have to be ... 
I believe the wou have to be a 
member o 
you give me an opinion on 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: Oka , I had Mr. Calderon and then Mr. 
Connelly. 
1\SSEMBLY~.AN CP."LDERON: 
exactly e na 
My understanding of this 
be constitutional, st 
Consti requires 
require, isn't the language 





of rules the 
rules that 
, for s 
adopting, would not 
provides. So, as to 
iona rescntat 
adoption and s 
mandatory requ rements of the 
I st want to clarify in my mind 
to (inaudible) ... 
, even though it may 
to what the 
change would 
at mandatory as 
mandatory as to 
t deal with 




of selection committees, the 
rements for the 
those are 
Yes, Mr. irman, just to engage 
in this, was lated to my question .•. 
Senate, 
mean to suggest 
distinguish between rules 
rules are ad and ich 
procedural is covered 
be covered are not cove 
1 allow that in the 
I didn't 
was trying to 
framework within which the 
rtual every 
current rules will still 
this initiative. And 
I r 
wou 













is thP official representat 
their staffs. It is 
4C-member execut coiT~ittee. 
first to 
Legislatures, 
cooperu.tion and third to 
in the federal system. Ms. Simon. 
ry for your 





there are a lot of things 
sal, but we are not 
's to hit high points 
best job that we can. 
ss. is Senior Program 
of State Legislatures. NCSL 
750 state legislators and 
governed by a 




MS. CINDY SIMON: Mr. Ch0 rman 
conuni t tee ... 
members of the 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: .. Ten 
MS. SIMON: Ten nutes. 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: 

















ssed in the Gann 
to comment on three 
comments. But, first, 
tiative are 
ral wisdom and 
, statutory 
and, third, the 
some of the 
many unique. rst, if 
n any subsequent court 
es the Gann 
instance in ich a 
detailed rules of 
out in statute and 
would sent ~ rst 
from 
State eg sla res ra 
of direct s. F st, there arc consti 
rate under 
11 be spelled 






t, but you sa 
would be the first 





































CHAIRNAN KEENE: r1r. 
position on we have 
que s to s 
be helpful. Or, if you a 
Pducate the tness, ust mak 
Proposit 
Campaign ces, 
would suggest that 
relationsh s 
public officials 




you would put 
statements, it would 
a statement, don't 
statement. 
You re not liar with 
referring to the Fair Political 
, wou 
in any detail. I 
of the external 
legislators and other 
contributions. It is 
of Legislature. 
you 1 to proceed? 
MS. SIMON: Final , in some instances, state 
legislatures pass islation establ certain legislative 
entities or processes -- for sunset procedures, 
statutory ttees and staff s, financial disclosure 
requirements and meetings. All of thesP form a network of 
guidelines which provide the legislat institution with a 
measure of certai , accountahili r clarity, order, and 
structure. 








which traditionally historical , and 
lly most state s s are the subject 
rule. s are formulated by the 
govern rations in a manner which 
ili and tical reality. 
r to the recent landmark 
sion of I~~igration and Naturalizatio~ 
Jn decision, the Supreme Court noted 
it cameral lawmaking acts and 
cameral rs recognized by 
act alone in 
matters. Similarly, 
General's 
decision in 1983 not to , very much 
islative business by like Gann, to 
statute. The Massachusetts 
it dea matters of ru 





CHAIRMAN KEENE: Mr. 
rather than laws or constitutional 
. Cha ? 
st the tness. Are 
n the Massachusetts 
ini iat there to ...• ? 
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most 1 slative ru 
appointments to 






Senate language i 
balance. In othe 
incJuding to 
cotegory are 
In 12 legislat s, 
leadership or caucus is g 
to appo party rs to 
legislatures, consultat 
representat are fol 
the rules. 
I wou note that in 
a moment ugo, that there are 
of one of our committees out 





s is not 






In this latter 
, and New York. 
, through its 
authori under the rules 
In other state 
proportional 
though not required under 
were handed out 
is the product 
NCSL -- there are some 
of members 
s proportional 
, and the 
the 
The of ional was 
izona case as was The United 









its ision, puzzled 
seats, the concept of 
slative 
ng of the 
is decision has 
involved, whether it be 
Houses of ss, or one of 
are not in a position to 
o requirements. The 
action ori vote. State 
instances for le, 
acts, or canst tut l amendments 
s as i s or a 
i 
i ls n California. 



































The mana structure var s greatly among the 50 state 
legislatures lik se, ionment of staff and other 
resources dif rs In several of the 1 
legislature is di and san 
s who are re of resources and 
staff. For example, and Michigan, the 
pr ipal majority pa leaders sian of 
resources hetween the two pattern for 
the legislature. In , where a strong, centralized 
nonpartisan staff serves the General Assemb , the principal 
majority leaders then control the d s of the remaining 
resources of Chambers 
In other states le F , Connecticut, 
Washington, Kansas and leadership committees are 
responsihle for dete of staffing levels and patterns 
either within a single house or for Chambers. 
Proportional allocation of resources is not required by 
constitut or statute n any state islature. In fact, 
however, a number of states attempt to achieve 
proportional ba Personal staff commonly are 
assigned li affili , and because of 
the predominance central isan staffing most state 
legislatures, pa members have comparable access to 






staff is awarded 
staff 
Connecticut for le, eve rank and file 
the arne staff resources, and each of the 
same 1 of sta The session 




, and caucus 
1 allocations 
rs receive 
1 staff is modest. 
wou note a, re there is a 
resources and staffing ly between the 












I ust make 
that the 10 
of concluding 




MS of r'? 
CHAIRMAN A sentences. 
MS 11 just 
resources two 
s officer's account and the of 
the House or Senate , 
ority and minority leadership accounts and partisan sta 
committees are the same. 
I wou are 
by a is no one 
appears to 1 states. 
is no one structure that Whether ly 
or unconsciously , there are s ficant tradeoffs that 
are made between strengths and weaknesses of each staffing 
and 
the 
















Thank much for acqua us 
states as it relates to the proposal 
ons of the ss? Thank you very much. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: ~~r. rman, just one. Isn't 
don't whether you 
MS. SIMON: I not·to. 
9-
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: e spPctive caucuses in 
the House o their re committee 
members rnthr:r than i se the committee 
memberr> 
MS. SIMON: Caucu 't think it is 
exclus a caucus decis The caucus, with the 
, I think it is a is used to select the 
members. There is islature where the 
caucuses, and I k it Congress, where the caucus 
do select s a that is Hawaii, and the 
organizat structure is all part of the 
organizat o we l and there's lots of 
negotiation that goes on, essent lly out of the majority 
caucus comes a slate of leaders nnd ttee members. Like-vlise, 
the minority caucus elects its 1 s and committeE"' chairs in a 
similar fash 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay Thank you for your testimony and 
your response. appreciate you th us. Perhaps you 
can provide sergeant, if she does not have it, with the full 
text of r statement. So i there. Okay. Fine. We'll 
incorporate into , then. 
Let rr~e take a ve br f moment. to introduce some of the 
.Assembl~r and Senate members who were not previously introduced. 
We have Assemb fv'laxine Waters \vi us, Assemblyman Lloyd 
Connelly, Assemb Ri Robinson, Senator Diane Watson, 
Senator Dav Poberti, Senator 01 raw, Senator Art Torres. 
Did I ? sitting sumab behind 
a law clerk to 
1978, j n 1978 and 






spirit of a 
SENATOR KEENE: I 
\•Je will inco 
're s 11 here. 
Robert Post and whi he's corning 
Professor of Law at 
of Yale Law School, has 
can C 1 ation, was 
States Court between 
Bazelon U.S. Court of 
r to He 
firm of Williams and 
ce to have you with 
, rman Keene. 
members of the Committee, I've 
of my statement. In the 
I' l rather summarize it. 
most beneficial. 
Thank you 
discuss re at of certa 
rman. I'm here today to 
isions of the Gann 







further provi s i s~ction 
the Legislature select cornm 
t's rese by the people. 
Now the California 
7 that each house of 
i , and it 
gives to each house r to make 
t either house of 
The Constitution, thus, 
s, to adopt rules, and 
power is different than 
of respects. Statutes 
slature and, unlike 
to select committees Notice that 
the power to enact tatutes 
must be adopted 
s1:c-,tutes, rult:~s 
Governor for s 
not be sented to the 
1. 
I'd 1 to b fly of se powers, the 
powers to adopt rules and the powers to appoint committees. 
SENATOR KEENE: Mr. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOE: Mr. Chairman. As you get into 
islature has the that, there says that the 
exclus s, is there? 
you mean, 
there. 
PROFESSOR h'e 1 
you re 
ss I would have to know what 
ng on the word "exclusive" 
ASSEMBLY~~N NAYLOR I mean if we, if we get into the 
question o r one may enact a rule by statute ..• 
PROFESSOR POST: 11 address the question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: ... then, I don't see anything 




It was considered so 
the California 
(1866) that it was 
Constitution could 
rules it own 
exist even if 
Similarly, the power. 
U}';IDENTIFI VOICE 
t s islature shall make 
the case that a 
The power to 
at the time the 
1849, originally adopted. 
was held at the time by 
call.ed ex parte McCarthy 
slature, and that if the 
, but power to make 
the Constitution and would 


















can be restr 
California 
consequence, I 
to deve its own ru 
a se a coromittee, and make 
intimated 
to the question of 
rst question, first 
because it's 
ion, and 
because it would 
1 authorization and 
constitutional provision. 
Well, if were not provided in the 
, and s s have some practical 
would inherent power of the Legislature 
s tut 1 magnitude? 











lem with the 
slatures govern 
also, universally, 
ss, govern their 
How are such 
, and I've seen the 
ity can be governed 
late. I think 
, what are called 
internal 
ss of 
islature must vote for 
house of the 
sly enacted a rule. 
be interpreted as the 
rules , in fact, have been 
to your attention 
construed an 
a witness before a 
questions could be prosecuted 
was challenged, 
s that it was an 
1 power of either 
lations for the 
of Columbia 
that a rule is 
form of a statute. In other 
s s Rdoption of 
from that analysis that either 
of 
SENATOR KEENE: 4 is in trouble, if that's 
correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYJ,OR: 
to the s 
J 
i 1 
s that, J assume, apply 
enacted and the Governor 
has signed into law? 
PROFESSOR POST: 
to such statutes. 
s ana is that I'm giving applies 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: 1 So that Section 9170 of 
the Government Code, which establi officers of the 
Assembly, a President pro Tempore, example, in 9171, which 
establishes the officers of, I'm sorry, of the Senate and of the 
Assembly Speaker. 
PROFESSOR POST: Could be superseded by unicameral rule. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Speaker not being established in 
the Constitution of California as such, then the Legislature or 
the Assembly, act on its own, could eliminate the Office of 
Speaker regardless of this statute establishing the Off •.. 
PROFESSOR POST: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLY~~N NAYLOR: Off , is that right? 
PROFESSOR POST: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: s with the President pro 
Tempore? 
PROFESSOR POST: That's correct. Now the Gann 
Initiat , the essential thrust is 
precise exercise of the discretion of each house 
to adopt rules and select tees. Various provisions of 
the Gann at provide how rules may be adopted by only a 
two-thirds majori That, of course, impairs the authority to 
adopt s less a irds majority. The provisions 
of the Gann create committees, say how those 
committees are , say how those committees are to 
vote -- all of are matters of internal operating procedure, 
all of which are nished Gann tiative. Now, if the 
Legislature were to enact a statute that had exactly the same 
provisions of the Gann Ini ative, would be valid to the 
extent that such a statute would, in effect, be the simultaneous 
adoption of unicameral rules each house of the Legislature, 
but the Gann i cannot be so construed for a number of 
reasons. 
ASSEMBLY~~N NAYLOR: Let me, but it could just as 
easily ... 



































initiat s--and an in 




For one i 





rat but a 










II, Section 8, which 
to the people, 
r to statutes or 
therefore, that 
on two kinds of 
s and statutory 
ses something that is 
Constitution would not 
s also true 
ishes a statute from a rule or a 
a number of 1 ways. 
lor. 
not be enacted by both 
a statute must. 
Governor before 
not. 
s what are rules 
unauthorized by 
also. 




a statute or an 
's cast in the 
it functionally? 
of things which 
yourself 
of the 1849 to 
94, that a rule 
f those members 
lly been 
reason why Section 
s or to 
realm of internal 
the sions of 
measures 
fails or re 
Certainly. By const 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: It 
provision does not distingui 
doesn't, s particular 
statute constitution. 
If the s can enact 
structure by statute, why cannot 
s or establi its 
the people enact such statutes? 
PROFESSOR POST: I suppose 
're not equivalent powers. 
it's subject to unicameral sion 
Legislature. When the people try 
statutory initiative, 's not. 
powers, and when the people 
statutory t as opposed to 
proposes a constitutional amendment, 
my answer to that is that 
the Legislature does 
each succeeding 
that through the 
fore, they are not parallel 
to do that 
an that 
1 provi which tell us 
other 
that this should be, this 
be the domain of power of should be, this constitutionally shou 




Just. I'm a 1 , I'm a 1 
Proposition 9, in order to be 
a two-thirds vote. It has to be, I 
, or 20 days, or some period of time. 
PROFESSOR POST 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: 
you suggesting that we could 











PROFESSOR POST: I suppose my answer to that 
que would be, would depend on whether construed 
Legislative Reform Act of '74, whi I think, is that Prop 9? 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Political Re Act. 
PROFESSOR POST: Re Act 
as a rule. My ... I would not construe that to const internal 
operating procedures of I.egis Now I you there 
may be gray areas about what is and is not a ru , the 
provisions about which I'm in the Gann Initiative fall 
squarely within traditional in s state, I 






action by each 
of contributions, the 
, to knowledge, 
operating 
unicameral 
same line, then, 
wouldn't s past, has construed 
as statutory enactments isn't that a pretty 
good source of, is a rule and what 
is a statute If necessary by statute 
to establish Of example, and by 
statute to establi ttees that sort of thing, why 
isn't it logical for a court to construe that as statute rather 
than internal rating ru s, which the Gann Initiative refers 
to, allows the Legislature to and is a separate body of? 
PROFESSOR POST: I th that's a good question, and I 
think one way o approaching an answer is to say that by 
enacting it as a statute, the isJature makes it public in a 
different sort of way. It g s to third parties in a way 
that it wou not to a rule. makes it enforceable in a way 
that it would not to a It s operative in the 
interim between sess s in a way that a rule would not be. 
How is it, and does it make it more 
enfo 
Legislature, 
understand. I mean so 
in terms of bind 
absolute sense 
Legis 
by, or enactment 
SENATOR KEENE: You'v~ 
can ignore unicamerally? 
as opposed to the 
a statute, you 
about differences 
to whether in an 
about whether the 
unicameral action or 
statute. 
about two minutes left. 
I've gone back quickly. I guess 
I would se sions are 
buttres of Mas s which was in 
December In Massachusetts, Constitution reserves to 
the people, also, power se laws amendments, and 
in Massachusetts, also, the Constitution reserves to each house 
of the slature the a make rules, but in 
Massachusetts, , like the Gann 
Initiat rnal rules of operating 
procedure Court of Massachusetts held 
that since than laws or amendments to 
the Consti court concluded 
that the rules House or the Senate 
cannot, under controlled by a statutory 
initiat , my ld a similar conclusion 





, that we' 1 
I wou vote 
one of 
can answer 












way that it 








, if you 
by line. 
I 
Acting Professor of 
SENATOR SPERAW: Would you be interested, J don't know 
whether or not it's the time, which would he to give your opinion 
to each one of the items as to whe or not it's valid or 
invalid? 
PROFESSOR POST: We could talk about that, sir. 
SENATOR SPERAW: You can ta 
PROFESSOR POST: I'm a state employee and certainly 
available 
SENATOR KEENE: Pe s we could resolve this by having 
you submit something in the record on those points that we will 
add to the record. 
PROFESSOR POST: If 
course I will. 
requests could be specified, of 
SENATOR KEENE: Okay. We'll have staff check with 
Senator Speraw as to the specifications of the request and ... 
PROFESSOR POST: Certa Thank you. 
SENATOR KEENE: Before you leave, I have one question. 
Assuming that neither or those arguments prevailed with the 
current court on the question of constitutionality, such that the 
result were that Proposition 24 were rendered unconstitutional, 
as you professionally surmise, let me ask this, or conclude. 
Surmise is a bad word. Let me this. The notion of the 
ostensible restriction on legislat spending for its own 
support, the so-called contingency fund, do you have any opinions 
on that? 
PROFESSOR POST: I have not analyzed that. 
SENATOR KEENE: Have you analyzed that portion? 
PROFESSOR POST: I have not analyzed that provision. 
SENATOR KEENF: Okay. Thank you very much. 
PROFESSOR POST: Thank you, sir. 
ASSEMBLY:tvf.AN NAYLOR: Nr. Chairman, just .•• 
SENATOR KEENE: Mr. Nay 
ASSEMBLY~Jl~N NAYLOR: One more question. Isn 1 t it true 
that the initiative in Massachusetts purported to amend the rules 








He was an to both 
Governor Edmund Brown, Jr. He' 









reasonable minds can 
That has 















last s we've had the 
ment Plan in 1983: i 1980 
so-cal im s 11 o 
Schmitz Death Penal J t 
,Jarvis-Gann 
the legal challenge 
some been al 





to recall one or 
invalidate the 
ani Reapportion-
Referenda; and the 
8; in 1978 the 
sition 13, the 
se measures survived 
Court, although 
construed. 
come to expect at least one 
llot each statewide 
measure 11 next appear on the 
Court, accompanied by angry 
Court, and veiled threats 
have the temerity to 
That's a per ly terr le ss. The Supreme Court 
is put in a no-win game in which, no matter how it rules, it is 
certain to be criticized, either for caving in to popular pres-
sure or for simply being a to the Democratic Party, 
because at the moment six of seven members of the Court are 
Democrats. 
It's 
and they're not 
and in public re 
civics texts tell 
ment of and not 
impart 
litics. 
is of total 
Occas 
required to resolve 
it very well, as the Uni 
Nixon tapes case. Somet s 
United States Supreme Court 
or should very, very 
just public dollars, 
reputation of the Court 
1 institutions. Our 
s that this is a govern-
s are professionally 
poor alike; and to 
accurate: no human 
udges try hard and, 
very well. 
highest courts are 
issues. Sometimes they do 
Court did with the 
badly, as the 
Scott. But it happens, 
----:--:---:---
popular faith in the 
i 1 nature of our bench is not adverse-
ly affected. 
We're losing 
Court. And no small part 
damned initiatives. If 
stra 
ifference to 
ly. I'm thi of 






s is not a 
-5 -
our Cali a Supreme 
that loss is these 
sometimes have come, 
course of legisla-
not feel so strong-
20, the Coastal 
fferent. The modern 
se measures, often for very 
ticism of Republicans alone, 
come to 
slature 're 
san profess sm that once made 
in the nation. They would eagerly 
can or Democrat, whose record showed a capacity 
partisan concerns. 
No one who was 
brought us the 
would be used, as 
But that is 
t a measure 
but surely is not too 
our editorial writers 
an 
of our 
It seems to me 
tisanship has infected 
that disease of excess par-
loser, or at 
are any winners, 
't know they are. 
's all I 
unless you have 
initiative process, and that big 
loser, is our Supreme Court. If there 
political campaign , I 
't think the public is. 
on s measure, Mr. 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: stions of Pro ssor Sto ? 
a 
gerrymander of 
, referended by 
and the Constitution 





How do view 
adopted as r own court 
referended by the people of the State of 
placed into law as a temporary court p 
-55-
PROFESSOR STOLZ: We I would you, Assemblyman, 
that you're speaking of the Deukmejian •.. 
not of 
Sebastiani ... 




sian. It's called Deukmejian st the (inaudible). 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Oh 
PROFESSOE STOLZ: That decision came down before the 
referenda took place. I'm not going to defend the merits of that 
decision. I think the Court, in its opinion, gave plausible 
reasons which were legitimate. They were not persuasive to you. 
I can understand why they were not. I have to confess they were 
not wholly persuasive to me either. On the other hand, particu-
larly with respect to the Congressional reapportionment, I don't 
know what else the Court could have done. That's not true of 
both the Assembly and the Senate But the decision was a very 
difficult decision, and it was, again, a decision which the 
Supreme Court, no matter wh they dec , would have lost. 
They would have been regarded as po tical no matter what they 
did. 
SENATOR SPEEAW: Mr. irman. 
CHAIEMAN KEENE: Senator 
SENATOR SPERAW: I sort of agree with the overview of 
the entire situation. And I'm not sure I would refer to 
them as "these damned in at but you did go on to clarify 
that they were caus by the of an unresponsive Legisla-
ture to public demand. But you did mention that fortunately 
there were some respons le, Republicans, who oppose this. 
And I would like to suggest to you -- you mention in particular 
one who happens to be a lobbyist now -- and I would suggest to 
you that there's just a ili there's an axe being 
ground there other than rnment. And that is (inaudible) 
the greater need to man present system that it would 
be if the (inaud le) 
PROFESSOE STOLZ: I have more respect for former Speaker 
Monagan , apparent 
SENATOR SPERAW: Well, but nevertheless, I'm not sug-
gesting anything except the present system is easier and 
there are fewer peop that have to be reached and influenced 
than there wou be under s. 
PROFESSOR STOLZ: That very well be true, but it's 
also true tiat e passes it will be nearly 





















I find it hard to believe, or at 
California Legislature would not re 
st I would hope, that the 
to passage of the 
Gann Initiative not any rules thereby defeating the 
whole purpose of iat 
ASSEMBLY~ffiN MOUNTJOY: 
making s 
No, the statement that you're 
be rtual blocked was 
addressed in a paper deve 
"The White Paper," published 
it, the Newspaper Publisher's 
the opposition that's called 
Dorais, it has his name on 
st Sacramento. 
PROFESSOR STOLZ: It was also 
ASSEMBLY~N MOUNTJOY: That statement is in here, but 
let me point out -- I want to to this point: that in fact, 
law and precedent has it. And that today we are operating on the 
Joint Rules that were last adopted. We have not yet in the Leg-
islature adopted our Joint Rules, yet we have waived those Rules 
time and time again. So there is a precedent that if, in fact --
and your statement comes from the point that a small minority 
could block the adoption of rules; but in fact, the operation of 
the House would continue under the priorly adopted Rules. That 
is the law precedent; that is the parliamentary precedent for 
years and years. And so, in fact, the Gann Initiative does noth-
ing to prevent anything of significance from being passed through 
the Legislature. Is that (inaudible)? 
PROFESSOR STOLZ: Well, I'm not going to argue the 
point. I do not think that that necessarily follows, that the 
practice of the st not to adopt the Joint Rules from prior 
years or not to make a particular issue of it, I'm not sure that 
can survive the passage of the Gann Initiative. The Gann Initia-
tive changes the Joint Rules many, many ways. Somebody's got 
to figure out what's al and what's dead in the Joint Rules, 
and they're going to have to be acted on. 
ASSEMBLY~N MOUNTJOY: But Joint 
PROFESSOR STOLZ: And I 
responsible for the body, e 
to adopt its own rules 
tive, if the Gann Init 
not think that it would be 
the Assembly or the Senate, not 
the passage of the Gann Initia-
ss. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Of course not. I think that 
would be highly irresponsible; however, the Gann Initiative does 
not change precedent. It s not change precedent, and it does 
not change parliamentary ru s. Would you address that? 
PROFESSOR STOLZ: 
does change the composit 
the vote that is required to 
for the adoption within the Rules 
two-thi vote of the Rules 
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s in some respects. It 
Rules Committee; it changes 
rules; it changes the rules 
Committee itself: it requires a 
to do anything. 
a 
t te I 1m 
s 
1 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: you 
CHAI~~N KEENF I ce 11. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: I ] as 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: Senator raw. 
It seems to me in addressing this 
sent problems and the reason why 
we talked about impeding moving 
SENATOR SPERAW: 
(inaudible) of opening 
there is a Gann Initiative, 
legislation (inaudible). 
(Gavel) 
We're looking at a situation now where (inaudible) under 
this system (inaudible) of the first. Under this system, one 
legislator representing 300,000 peop can gain as much power, or 
nearly as much power, as the Gover-nor of the state, who is elect-
ed statewide. Now this is the question that we're addressing. 
Now, tell me whether or not, when one person gains that much 
power, whether or not that has some effect on the Legislature? 
(Inaudible) 
PROFESSOR STOLZ: The question is addressed to me: but I 
have a feeling it's addres to you, Mr. Chairman. I have the 
feeling I'm the net in the tennis court, and I don't really 
belong. 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: ~'Jell, I 
Initiative, to 
le) what's wrong with the Gann 
at what's wrong now. 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: Okay, I think you framed the question 
importantly. You choose to believe that one man has that much 
power. I think that's questionable. You also choose to believe, 
or at least assume, that the current leadership of the two Houses 
does not reflect the of the Houses themselves as a coequal 
branch of government. I choose to feel that it does. You choose 
to feel that it does not for various reasons. But that's as far 
as I can go, I guess. J guess we view world differently, and 
the legislative process as a part of that world differently as 
well. 
Any questions of Professor Stolz at this point? 
Mr. Naylor. 
ASSEMBLYMAN Nl\YLOR: Mr. Chairman, you can count this 






But from my vantage point outs th0 Legislature, I don't think 
you're right. I just don't think that's an accurate statement of 
what's transpired. 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: I 
we need to move along now. 
issue has been joined, and 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I want Mr. Naylor to join me on 
the Peripheral Canal on why he's making this argument, though, so 
he can characterize that with the Governor's current position. 
PROFESSOR STOLZ: Are you done with me? 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: Yes, thank you. Thank you very much, 
Professor Stolz. 
\.Val ter Zelman. 
Let's set!, he's the Executive Director of Common Cause 
in California, and former Professor of Political Science at the 
Claremont Colleges in the University of California. 
It's good to have you with us. 
MR. WALTER ZELMAN: Thank you very much. 
I'd like to start by saying that Common Cause has no 
position, as yet at least, on the Gann Initiative; and yet I've 
been asked to come here, and I thought I would share some views 
about how some of the principles we hold apply to some of the 
elements of the Gann Initiative. 
I've already learned this morning that the Initiative 
may not be quite as extreme as I had expected, in terms of the 
breadth of the two-thirds vote clause. Nevertheless, I should 
suggest that Common Cause is general opposed to two-thirds 
vote, except on very basic cons tutional matters. We believe 
that the minority has the right to participate and that rules 
should guarantee that; but the minority does not have the right 
to rule, or even in our view, right to veto the will of the 
majority. Minority rights, in short, are the rights to try to 
win, not the rights to win. 
For these reasons we opposed Proposition 13, and we 
continue to advocate a constitutional amendment that would 
eliminate the two-thirds vote requirement on spending, the 
budget, and tax expenditure items. 
I would suggest that there's a certain irony, I think, 
in what I've experienced over the last few months. As an advo-
cate for Common Cause for many years now, I've always been 
accused of being the Puritan; b~oing the individual that couldn't 
compromise; being the outsiders; being the naive party to poli-
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Mr one 
MR. ZELMAN: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN Your statement is fine. What I'd like 
to do most o s t thnt the 
What I'd 1 you will, is give us what 
cations of the Gann your perception is of 
Initiative. You've heard some a s as to whether or not it 
What I'm wondering, from your 
observer and as someone who under-
may or may not be constitut 
perspective as a legis 
stands the process of decis 
think that there will be any 
result if, in fact, the Gann 
tional~ and if, in fact, it does 
legislative process? 
ing the Legislature, do you 
1 ramification that would 
is held to be constitu-
have its desired intent upon the 
MR. ZELMAN: I guess I feel one of two things will 
happen: Either the rules will be treated with infinitely greater 
flexibility than they ever were before, and virtually every com-
mittee will open up with a waiver of the rules and nothing will 
happen; or, on the other hand, and this is perhaps the greater 
danger, the minority will use its rules levers to perhaps affect 
substantive outcomes; to, effect, bargain over what will be 
ultimate substantive outcomes by bargaining over how the money is 
going to be allocated, or bargaining and using their power in the 
new Pules Committees to, in effect, cut deals that are really 
substantive deals over procedural matters. In the extreme, 
therefore, the Legislature could stagnate and bog down. I sus-
pect something between the two will occur. 
I should note -- I haven't heard much discussion this 
morning of the cut in slative budget. That's one thing I 
think Common Cause would safely that while clearly there may 
be excesses in islature's budget-- and we've had this 
argument every since Ja s; one rson's fat is another person's 
meat -- who is to say 30% is the legislative 
budget? I'm sure there are 120 people who would have different 
definitions of what the 30% fat in the Legislature's budget was. 
I think I'd be very conce , not only about some arbi-
trary size cut l that, hut, , I would be concerned 
about what, in fact, the s 11 cut if forced to cut. 
My concern is, quite b , that legis would keep those 
people close to them were their best political people, and 
what would be cut would be the le who were stronger on the 
policy side. And in the run, that would not be in the pub-
lic interest. The Maj Consultants would be kept; the Senate 
staffs that prepare memos for committees might be undermined. 
And that would clearly not be in pub st. So I think 




Cause s never 
government does. 
The public in any one 
public may want to 




procedure is a 
And that would 
Yes, Mr. 





, trying to r 
recently I 
11 that if 
will have much more 
comes true and the attempt to 
fact, opens up a loosening of 
rules on a constant 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
ture, 
employees; turning out 
turn out at the present 










MF. ZELMAN: I think 
the Legislature .... 
thout question. The quality of 
SENA'l'OR SPERAW: No, the quality of the laws. 
MR. ZELMAN: The quali of the laws is for every indi-
vidual out there to j The quali oi legislative pro-
cess, as far as I'm concerned, has improved immeasurably. 
CHAIFJv'I.AN HARRIS: '!'hat's what he said. 
MR. ZELMAN: I said I think the quality of the legisla-
tive process has improved enormously. Whether you want to argue 
that their bills are better, or more in tune with the public 
mentality or the public's desires, I think is another question. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
SENATOR SPERAW: Some three years ago, the Legislature 
added 37% to its discretionary fund. It went from, I believe $75 
or $80 miJlion to $105 million in one year. Nas Common Cause 
concerned at that time, as you are now, (inaudible) concerned 
with that? Were you concerned at the time on where the 37% ini-
tial increase went all in one year's time? 
MF. ZELMAN: No, we had no position on that. We rarely 
get involved in that kind of a measure, in terms of that kind of 
allocation. 
SENATOR SPERAW: You're expressing concern now about 
what cuts wou if s took p But you're saying 
you weren't concerned at the time that some 37% was added to it 
(inaudible). 
MP. ZELM..Jl.N: I'm suggesting that I wouldn't be upset if 
the Legislature evaluating its own budget decided that, "we can 
absorb a 30% cut." And if the slature decided to cut its 
budget 30%, I don't think Common Cause would get involved in 
that. The quest is an outside force, in fact, the public or 
Mr. Gann, coming in and sting that this 30% is an appropri-
ate figure to cut the budget. I'd rather leave that decision up 
to the Legislature. That's what you're there to do; and I don't 





Mr. Mountjoy, very br 
ASSEMBLYMAN M.OUNTJOY: 










durcs; perhaps to give the licans in the Assembly some vice 
chairs and things like that. And that is the appropriate 
response to the present situat , not probably this much more 
rigidified set of re s to a s tuat 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Thank you, Mr. Zelman. 
Mr. Mountjoy, you're on. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Well 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, no, no. You're on to testify. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Okay, what I ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, Mr. Mountjoy 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: It seems to me ..• 
CHAIRMAN Hl<RRIS: Mr. Mountjoy. We need to move the 
meeting along, Mr. Mountj 
ASSEMBLYMAN ~WUNTJOY: I'll speak when my .•• 
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: Mr. Chairman 
CHAIIDRAN HARRIS: Mr. Monnt.joy ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Let me just make a request of 
you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS All right, Mr. Mountjoy. 
ASSEMBLY~~N MOUNTJOY: I would like to allot some of my 
time, whi wou read part of the preamble that 
Paul Gann put forth, need of the people to have this reform 
initiative. 1 could do that. I would rather, if, with the 
indulgence of the Chair, ask Mr. Gregory if he could come back, 
and give some of my time to him. Because there are some specific 
questions that I think we need to •.• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr Mountjoy 
l<"SSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: . . . go into in furtherance with 
the initiat cou to the microphone and address any 
questions the committees may have of me. 
CHP._IRMAN HARRIS: No, Mr. Mountjoy, first of all, it's 
your right --what you're is you'd like to submit a state-
ment for the record from Mr. Gann, the preamble to Prop 24? 





Do want me 
or can I 
1, wasn t 














P.SSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I wasn't arguing with your 
belief. 
JI.SSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: 
seats were necessary 
could, in fact, 
caucus was that, "hey, 
increase." I was never a part 
caucus that said, "give us a 
we'll give you the pay raise." 
don't have any real 
occurred at the same time. It 
were upset about the that 
disenfranchised. Yes. 
~SSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: 
CHAIRJY'J\N HARRIS: Mr. 
S because they were -- those 
so that the majori party 
The consensus of our 
be no legislative pay 
caucus or any part of that 
that's fair and 
I just wasn't part of that, so I 
was an occurrence. It 
that many legislators 
several of our members were 
nk you. 
} . 
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: Yes, my 2¢-worth, I was not 
privy to what went on in the As ly caucuses; however, I 
remember as clear as if it just happened an hour ago, the then 
minority leader of the Assembly, Mrs Hallett -- and I'm sure 
people can ask her for her s if they hate speaking when 
she's not here. But the fact of the matter is, she informed me, 
and wanted me to know, why the raise bill was not going to 
pass. And she said, "Quite ly it's because of our lack of 
success on the reapport bill. This is our only lever. 
And therefore the pay raise bill is not going to pass." And just 
wanted me to know, and I could to the Speaker, or 
whoever else was a relevant rson So I mean, it was tied in as 
clear as any could made. I frank thought that was 
improper. And obvious , at some later date we acted on what we 
thought was the impropriety of that was taken at that 
time. But :it was in knows that it 
was tied in and that it was exercise of power; 
because those kinds of are not related just, you 
know, have no business e law or under the rules. 
that you're 
Zelman was s 
do this under 
does not prevent 
Rules Committee. A major 
expend funds. The only 
of funds would then 
ty. There is noth 
prevents expe tures of 
Committee. 
Let me just address the point 
we were making with Mr. 
no power of the minority party to 
, se the Gann Initiative 
ture of Rules by 50% vote of the 
vote f the Rules Committee can 
renee is that a proportional amount 
to be al to be spent by the minori-
there is no way that the Gann Initiative 
s a maj vote of the Rules 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: ~1r. Mount j 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: It s not 
are you 





lutely to expenditure of 
funds from a 
tive Counsel, 
Journal, from hiring of Legisla-
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: But the Gann .•. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: re 
consultants, those types of things. 
analysts, committee 
Mr. Mountjoy, you're the 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: No, I'm not begging the question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: .•• ( le) that budget, that 
money be expended on a partisan basis; and I'm asking you what 
you're going to do with your share. I'm not arguing with the 
point that it can done by a majority vote. Mr. Gregory's 
testimony was c on that point. But what do you do with your 
share of the money that's used to expend upon a Daily File, a 
Daily Journal, and chaptered bills and what have you? 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: If we, Mr. Robinson, dec to 
block the vote of some pencil buying because we thought they were 
political pencils, then we would have to probably buy our own 
political penci 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: No. No, Mr. Mountjoy, you are 
not answering my question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Yes, I am. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: It is drafted in a way that 
the legislative printing allocation is split on a partisan basis. 
That means those funds that have been regularly and customarily 
used for the printing of the Journal will split on the rela-
tive proportion of the parts and representation within both Hous-
es. And I'm asking you, since have no responsibility -- the 
minority party -- for actually running the House, how are you 
going to spend your share of the Daily Journal money? 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Well, I assume that we would have 
to spend it for printing of our own Daily Journal if we wanted 
one, I guess. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you, Mr. Mountjoy. 
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All right, Mr. 
some more questions he'd 
Mr. Gregory, Mr. Mountjoy has 
ss to you. 
ASSEMBLY~~N MOUNTJOY: 
tions. Could two members of the 
just a coup of ques-
Senate s, or three members 
of the Assembly Rules Committee, 
legislative action -- under the Gann 
absolute veto power over 
ative? 
MR. GREGORY: Yes, 
tive action would be to expend s on 
not a proportional basis; because -- As 
by a majority vote they can expend funds 
If there's any decision to do otherwise, 
than a majority vote to do so. So .•. 
if the desired legisla-
a basis which would be 
you indicated earlier, 
on a proportional basis. 
it would require more 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: But not for normal legislative 
action. The assignment of bills to committees, the assignments 
of committees, that type of thing, is still a majority vote. Is 
it not? 
MR. GREGORY: The assignment of bills would be a majori-
ty vote. 
ASSEMBLY~AN MOUNTJOY: Let me go back -- I've got one 
more. Why don't you ask him your question while I'm looking? 
Ask him -- go ahead. I'm going to look up another question, then 
he's going to ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Could I just ..• 
CHAI~AN HARRIS: Mr. , is it to Mr. Gregory? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Mr. Gregory, when you -- just 
before you sat down you basically sa that the beginning of the 
session would be mess. I think was -- or at least you agreed 
with that characterization because of -- of what? I don't under-
stand. 
~R. GREGORY: Well, interrelationship of the 
the general principles of law that if you don't 
adopt rules at the beginning , then by custom and 
usage you have no rules but look to the rules of the prior 
session as to hov1 you should operate. And what has happened in 
the past, of course, is there s been no radical change in the 
rules from session to sess , and so the body sort of flows 
along, using the rules of a sess 
Here we have 
would come in and establish 
which deal with some very 
other words, the 
committees. And 
whether or not 
with sition 24, which 
a number of changes in the rules 
1 of the body. In 
conwittees, the composition of 
issue is going to be raised as to 






I refer then also to 
that gives someone a right to 
unction, or 1 
Proposition. It 
have 
So was s of statement. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: But re 
ment of 
to as 
committees, which it seemed to me 
b st mess, why wouldn't 
s -- I 
Why wouldn't 
no rules were 
committees, 
stand current s of 
MR. GREGORY: Well, 
s might be an easier 
has operated with -- the As 
of committees , you know, 
are some committees 
and Means Committee, 
committees 
, and probably would 























ASSEMBLYIJAN NAYLOR: Okay, what I want to know is, in 
the event of no action by the Legislature December 1st, adopting 
new rules authorizing new committees, why wouldn't the existing 
committees ... 
MR. GREGORY: Well, it was 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Membership is another question, but 
the existing 
MR. GREGORY: •.• except that one of the rules that would 
be continued, if you just went by the rules of the prior session, 
is the rule that the Speaker, at the beginning of a session, 
decides, you know, what the committees are, the size of the 
committees. And then, of course, after the Speaker -- and then, 
of course, appoints the chairman and vice chairman and members of 
the committees. And 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Well, admittedly that would change 
t-1R . GREGORY: ..• and then-- and then 
ASSEMBLY~~N NAYLOR: ..• but the existence of the com-
mittees and which committees exist -- I guess the size -- Does 
the size determine ... 
MR. GREGORY: No, you'd have to reformulate the commit-
tees, because the committees are not a continuing body from one 
-- the Rules Committees are unique the statute; but the normal 
rule is that a standing committee on a subject matter jurisdic-
tion is not a continuing body. And so when you adjourn sine die 
from one session and then begin the brand new session, there is 
no continuing exist.ence of that particular cornrni ttee. And so .•• 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: But that •.. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Excuse me, Mr. Naylor. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I don't mind you asking the witness a 
question, but I don't want you to get into a debate with him. 
ASSEMBLY~illN NAYLOR: No. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: He's already answered the question. 
ASSEMBLYJVl-AN NAYLOR: Yes, I know. I'm .•. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: If he doesn't give you the answer you 
want ... 
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MR. POST: Senator, that one person is elected by 
majority rule of the house, and is the ority that was 
elected by the people at the 1 box. 
SENATOR SPERAW: 
is able to make sure that 
overlooking the fact that 
is paralyzed almost the 
You are ing that one person 
they get elected, and you are 
se of s system the re house 
se of battle within 
and over that pos of 
MR. POST: I am not overlooking it and as you may know I 
was a co-sponsor of an il fated initiative using the process to 
try to do something about the, what I think, is an inordinate 
amount of money that pervades all of the process. And I 
don't speak only of the slature, but wherever there are 
elections today, we too much money, in view. And 
although is an extreme fficult problem to deal with, I 
think that that to addressed. But, I don't blame the 
Speaker for that. I 11 Richardson, Senator Richardson, 
has been collecting of lect money. That's 
the name of the 're going to there is to 
get after, in some way, a very fficult , of limiting how 
much money is in election system, but I 't that you 
do that by making -- by pushing the business of the Legislature 
underground. I had too much th state 
legislatures of eastern states, and I have always thought 
that California was a state. We with 
lls; we had open ngs; went to a vote, and I can tell 
you what those legislators they out of 
caucuses and on raw power just lls into wastebasket 
whenever they wanted to, and I to see that happen in 
California. It may not happen s initiative, but the 
more you move toward san caucus government, more 
are likely to of raw And would be 
a sorry day, I think, for all of us. 
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You know, the hell 
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it must be very 
itical 
ship that the 
extreme 
, and as 
thinking 
I go to bed at 
much money." 
and then is 
where he can 







V.le 've got 
is not 

















as well as you 
































inform us of 
And if he 
my committee 
s me to do it, 
my job." I don't 


























ting ru and 










current rules and 
the Chairman of the 









tiati ve ••. 
voters 
was never on the ballot by 
wasn't ki committee 
s 
t was defeated by the 
s. 





































blamed for what 
them effective 
f today, and I 
to far Proposition 24 
have enormous regard ~1r. Gregory, 
he holds the position he 
more we 
As ly Rules 
corresponding 
that no one 
lf of the 
s is 
by two-thirds. 
't know. But, 
rules. 
so you don't 
intent, 
















to do. However, 
legations or 







shing many of the things 
section, whether it 
of the Committee, 
It says "any action." 




























answer is a 
adopted, that 
The second 
















of story to bal-
l too often, the only 





a bonanza for spe-











s of their own party 
on 
part s in both 
l constraint on 
; I'm hoping. 
not 
the 










MS SHARON Yes. 
CHAIRMAN Do 
MS. SCHUSTER: s 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: Do 
well? 
SCHUSTER 


































11 be here. 
z is not re. Okay. Are 
oral statements today? 
called Mr. Dotson. 






II, Section 7, 






















he got out the door 
reapport process; 
to that I d do that 
to a meeting on the 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Have a ce weekend, Dick. 
PROFESSOR WELSH 
Legislative Procedure, it 
The con 
legis 
2 of Mason's Manual of 
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its own procedure 









with the ru s of 
the rules conta 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: 
see how you can say, based on 
Constitution it's c 
PROFESSOR WELSH: I 
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One sees 




And we have never 
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lawmaking. 
1 Section 10 
lls before 
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sented to Governor. 
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That is statement. 
CHAIRMAN 








CHAIRMAN KEENE: Yes, 
Mr. Lowenstein and Mr. Welsh, i 










opportunity to appear 
have been discussed 
of 33,000 
you just briefly. 
any of your testimony in 
All right, thank you. 
s have described 
," 
11 How to Wreck the 
Legislature," "Voter or Treat?" "Tyranny or Reform?" 
spends on 
everybody 
fact, it constitutes 
seven 
i 
we 1 re 
le 
, it 
MS. SCHUSTER: But 
things, to 




is, probab too much. In 
lf of 1% of total state 
30% ove i the past 
of state legislatures, 
5 $ • 
Excuse me, ma'm. 
rate of flat 
Mr. Chairman. 





gone up about 
was more than 70% 
we were experiencing 






experience 13% a 
was calculated 
to you 
ss. She doesn't 
the ; or or not was for 
capital out ; or not 
--i.e., reapportionment; and so on 
were extraordinary expenses 
and so forth. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Well 
MS. SCHUSTER: Yes 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I understand, 
general statement and you asked a very 
sure she's not prepared to answer. That 
a statement 
I think she had a 
question that I'm 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: We had to ld our Capitol, which 
was falling down. We had to deal redistricting that was 
heavily contested in the courts and elsewhere. These are •.. 
ASSEMBLY.r."'~N 
CHAIRMAN Twice. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: We only had to 
once, Mr. Keene. 
ld the Capitol 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: We redistricted twice, and you 
spent -- the minority party spent as much as the majority party 
-- twice. 
money on 
And now we must be spending that 
we're not doing it again. 




s, Cali was 27th 
capita personal income 
the 1981 ranking 
expenditures, based 
the 50 states. 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: Oh yes, 
did we not? 
we granted minority staff, 
MS. SCHUSTER: 
referred to, in textbooks 
York, overall legis 
But California is frequently 
periodicals, as top, along with New 
That quality is rectly related to 2,200 employees 
who now toil in Sacramento, helping legislators analyze and 
understand the complex s affecting school financing, medical 
care, agribus ss, 1 justice environment, and other 
aspects of a complex society. In , California has one of 
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the best legis res in the country it hires a research 
branch. And this is 
draconian cut, should 
capability at least equal to the executive 
the legislative budget that would take the 
Gann pass. 
This controversial half of 1% also ys for the 
legislat.or' s district and Sacrar:1ento office staffs, whose most 
important function is i th constituents. Senator 
Hello has told AAtm that his office receives and responds to 
5,000 pieces of mail a year. He requires each letter to be 
answered within five We o not believe that if a 30% cut 
were made, it would come from s aspect of the budget, because 
no legislator would cut off life blood of reelection, not 
even lengthen the turn around t for answering constituent 
letters, if another choice exists. 
And it does. It is the 
that would take the entire 30% 
Legislature any more dependent 
making on lobbyists and special 
slative consultant staffs 
AAUW does not want the 
information for decision 
interests. 
The second topic, taking the power to appoint conuni ttee 
members from the Assembly Speaker and the Senate Rules Committee 
and giving it to the party caucuses, then requiring virtually all 
Rules Committee votes of any substance to meet two-thirds test 
concerns us. The result would be that a handful of members of 
the minority caucus would rtually control the Legislature. 
If Gann were in place now, you could control the Senate 
if you control eight of its members, since there are 15 
Republican Senators and make a majority of their caucus. 
They appoint two of the rs of the Senate Rules 
Committee where the wou require a two-thirds vote. 
When the two m Rules fail to vote the caucus 
way ... 
ASSEMBLY!viAN NAYLOR: Ms. Schuster ... 





tell me where it says that 
expenditures, require a 
MS. SCHUSTER: I've been listening to the testimony 
about that, and it seems to me that neither option is acceptable. 
Either, if its a cisproportionate expenditure it would require a 
two-thirds; if it were not, and red only a majority, then 
there would be no reasonable ru it was a reasonable 
expenditure. It was on be the sense to get the 
majority -- in other iture was giving on the 
other side in order to vote. And that's not a 
reasonable way to make itures The expenditure should be 
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on s. 
its merits wou 
MS 
But -- mean .•• 
approval on 
to block it. 
is acceptable. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: were on 
troub 
were 
two-thirds meritorious, you wou 
vote, right? 
MS. SCHUSTER: Not neces Not necessarily. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
MS. SCHUSTER: When we're dealing with the situation ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: (Inaudib ) proportional 
expenditures only require a majority vote, so when you're talking 
about eight people controlling slature 
MS. SCHUSTER: Wel 's true, in sense 
ASSEMBLYMAN I you're ignoring 
MS. SCHUSTER: ••. but the proportional would not 
necessarily be a wise expenditure, is what I'm saying. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Please, would you •.• 
MS. SCHUSTER: Just a little bit more. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
MS. SCHUSTER: We 
if these two minority 
way, they can be replaced 
minority could stymie 
to allow bills to be 
All right. 
are concerned about the potential that 
of Rules failed to vote the caucus 
with two who will. And thus the 
entire legislative process by refusing 
, and so on so forth. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Wait a Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, Mr. Naylor. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: There's nowhere that says that it 
takes a two-thirds to assign lls or allow bills to be heard. 
All of that is te clearly majority rule in the initiative. 
MS. SCHUSTER: But the control of the minority 
members, that would also pass 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: But a majority can assign bills. A 
majority in the committees to which they are assigned can pass 
bills. I think you're as that it takes a two-thirds vote 
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to assign 





MS. SCHUSTER: I 
will be a continuation of 
minority. 
CHAIRP~ HARRIS: Okay. 
not. That 
that Mr. Mountjoy 
tiative. 
assuming that there 
the power of the 
(Inaudible general conversation) 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We 
record, don't we? 
MS. SCHUSTER: 
most of your statement for the 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay, so you can just move toward 
conclus 
MS. Well, me just sum up then. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 





reason I'm asking you to do 
into a debate with 
I won't give him the 
MS. SCHUSTER: Let me just sum by saying that in our 








of AAUW are supportive of the current 





will be on 
zation, based on 
very much, Ms. Schuster. 
your taking the time to 
ss and the of time 







for the Advancement of 
Mrs. Canson 









legal, procedural 1 
been thoroughly 









you and Mr. Gann 1 is, 
Speaker of As 
will to avoid 
consciousness, just as 
would all do well to 
Gann's offens 
who are 
to That will 
s We that from 
, no, no no. Mr. Robinson and 
you here. My 
of the Southern Area 
be reading for you a 
Canson, who as I'm sure you 
Western , Association 
Colored People. 
the Joint Committee, 
regrets that 
at this hearing. You 
NAACP National Urban 
Summit on the State of the Black 
Nashvil , Tennessee, May 3, through 
s important meeting. 
1-
, I wou just like to 
fferent approach to 
unsaid. The 
and opinions have 
invites your attention 
very much verbal or 
l to examine Gann 
relate to an 
right-wingers, to 
will hand over 
our 
, each time I reviewed 
aspect became apparent. 
I also ask 
24 if the 
Far too many people 
even though in their 
question lies. We 
sence of this aspect of 
ASSEMBLYMAN Mr. rman. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, , Mr Nay 
Because I'm going to leave 
about 
testimony. 
to comment on that aspect of the 




ly every issue raised in 
Leo McCarthy's speakership and 
people most prominent in the 
for llie Brown for Speaker, 
I deeply and bitterly resent 
racist intent in Proposition 
Proposition 24 campaign all voted 
giving him a crucial margin. 
the implication of some sort of a 
24. 





in its enti 
so we don't need to hear that, 
MR. DOTSON: well. 
getting 
MR. DOTSON: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I 
, or in re 
respond to that by 
by prior speakers, 
ing, but we 
we're faced with 
made. 
than read the statement 
printed in the record, 
are pressed for time ... 
I think members are 
conclusion, or 
earlier testimony you 










authority in this 
to make rules for a 
NAP.CP is opposed 
is as the reasons that 
MR. DOTSON: That is correct. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: .•• (Inaudible) Mrs. Canson sent. 
MR. DOTSON: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. And one of the things that you 
stated is that you think that it's inconsistent with the two-
party system? Is that right? 
MR. DOTSON: Yes, that is correct. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. And one of the things that you 
stated is that you think that it is inconsistent with the 
two-party system. Is that right? 
Monday. 
MR. DOTSON: Well, yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, Mr. Naylor. 
ASSEMBLYMAN NAYLOR: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right, thank you. See you on 
Well, thank you. I am looking for things, but I think 
that you have stated, very clearly, the proposition. 
MR. DOTSON: Yes, I believe on page 4 it addresses the 
problem of the two-party system •.• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: •.. Okay, thank you. 
MR. DOTSON: ••• and what it may portend that if it 
becomes necessary because there is a majority of Democrats in 
this state and if it becomes absolutely necessary for a 
two-thirds majority, it may push one party, the one that has the 
greatest potential for making a two-thirds majority in the 
Legislature, by electing two-thirds members they may do that and 
that, in our opinion, is not good for a two-party system. There 
should be balanced representation. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you Mr. Dotson. We have your 
testimony in response to -- who is that. 
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE VOICE: Abby Leibman, Women Lawyers. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, Ms. Leibman. I am sorry. 
Welcome. Thank you very much for your patience. Sorry to have 
you waiting around all this time. I hope we didn't destroy your 
lunch hour. 
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MS. ABBY LEIBY~N: ? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. lor's Mr. Mountjoy's. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
gave Ms. a 
would like to do is 
the concerns we have. 
CHAIRY~N HARRIS: 
MS. LEIBMAN: 
you on behalf of the 
thank , of course, 
comment on Gann I 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
I would like to do is -- I 
tten testimony and what I think I 
spoken record highlight two of 
name is Abby Leibman. I appear before 
a Women Lawyers, and I want to 
providing us this opportunity to 
Women Lawyers is a statewide 






as 1 and represents the 
of women lawyers in the state of 
we cannot .•. 
st stops r 
Mr. Hamm's test 
HAMM: 
in the middle of a . ) 
1984-85. 
the rate of growth 
for all years 
to the 
13 of the 
it may be 








Article 13 (b) 
proceeds of 
Legislature 
sn t reduce the 
appropriation 
t, and amount 
in any way. 
Now as we read Article 9934, that is not the case with 
Proposition 24. The appropriation limit in 1985-86 would be 
based on the amount spent in 1984-85. What that means, of 
course, is if the Legislature doesn't appropriate up to its 
appropriation limit in so doing, it is reducing dollar for dollar 
its appropriation limit in the following year. Similarly, if the 
Legislature does not spend everything that it appropriates for 
any year, it reduces dollar for dollar its appropriation limit in 
the following year. 
Now, the significance of this, I think, is twofold, and 
I present this just as fact and not as an implied criticism of 
the measure because given the fact that under the Government Code 
we must do an impartial analysis of all of these measures, it is 
not my purpose to criticize any of them. But, I think the 
consequences of this type of an appropriation limit are first, 
that over time it will be very difficult for appropriation in 
support of the Legislature to keep pace with general fund 
expenditures, not withstanding the purpose expressed in this 
initiative simply because of the fact that you are going to have 
slippages. And secondly, it provides some incentive to the 
Legislature to appropriate the full amount of the limit 
regardless of whether or not it thinks it needs all that money 
this year because it has to maintain its options for future 
years. For example, in the year before the year in which the 
Legislature would have to incur the costs of doing a 
reapportionment, it might decide that it doesn't need all of that 
money, but in order to have the money available in the following 
year, it would have to appropriate all of that money and then in 
the last two weeks of June it would have to act like executive 
branch agencies frequently act, and that is whatever we do, let's 
not let any of that money go back to the Treasury. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Not only appropriate, but spend. 
MR. HAMM: Exactly. I just thought that was an 
important aspect ••. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That is an important point. I 
appreciate that. 
MR. HAMM: .•. that had not been raised. Other than 
that, I am, of course, at your disposal and will answer any 
questions. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you, Mr. Hamrn. I appreciate it 
very much. 
I want to thank all of you who are still here, and we 
will conclude the testimony and the hearing. 
* * * * * * * 
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Mr. Chairman and 
Legislative Counsel 
of the committee for the 
and procedures of the 
adopted by the people at 
implemented. 
The measure would 
law relating to legislative 
funding, and would 
"Legislative Reform Act 
Sec. 9900), Pt. 1, 
subject matter. I will 
chapter and then identify those 
by the measure but would not be clearly replaced or 
CHAPTER 8 





Proposition 24 is 





Section 9900 titles Act 
of 1983"), Section 9901 
concerning existing and 
9902 states the purported purposes for the enactment of the 
Section 9903 would require that the chapter be liberally construed to 
accomplish its purposes. 
Sections 9904-99'05. 
Section 9904 would permit the the new chapter 
to be amended only by compliance the procedures stated therein. 
Specifically. subdivision (a) would that the may be 
amended only to further its purposes, by statute, passed in each 
house by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the 
membership concurring and by the Governor. and only if, at 




the choosing of 
11, Art. IV, Cal. 
(subd. (c), Sec. 7, 
two houses together 
two-thirds vote of members 
extent to which its proceedings 
supersede any prior statutes 
Legislature to set 
there is no 
more a majority vote. 
Article 2 
inspection. 
chapter may be amended or 
only when approved by the 
approved by the voters) 
, the latter would 
contrast to existing law, under 
to adopt, amend, and repeal, 
to its internal procedures, including 
selection of committees (Sees. 7, 
, the California Constitution 
. Const.) specifically empowers the 
concurrent resolution, adopted by a 
each house, with regard to the 
are to be public. These resolutions 
which they conflict. Finally, where 
rules of procedure in a statute, 
the statute be adopted by any 
legislative powers and duties. 
law insofar as it makes the 
the efficient conduct of the 
of the Assembly and provides for 
commencement of the session. 
with the discussion of the 
Committee, the powers of the Speaker to 
1 
by the proposition. 
part: 
in the Assembly a 
of the Speaker, 
committee, and six 
to be elected by 
""''"'
0
' ... of Members in the 
the party having 
, the Assembly Rules 
Speaker, who is also 
, Minority Floor Leader, and 
are mem'.:>ers of the majority party, 









, or the hiring or 
authorization of 
committee. 
to the matter or 
formally adopted by the 
to Assembly Rules Committee 
provides: 
~~~~ on Rules, That it 
custom and practice 
on Rules, in the 
committee, to 
duties, and assume 
in relation to the 
, appointment of 
Assembly. the execution 
contracts, the performance of 
new provision that makes all 
Speaker of the Assembly subject 
the Assembly Rules Committee. 
statutory power to make 
contain a comparable provision with 
Rules Committee. 
pro Tempore of the 
to the Speaker) 
to the election of the 
Tempore 
and administrative 
the Senate Rules 
rules committee would be 
be the chairman , 
and two members selected 
of members. Present 
the committee but the 
by the entire Senate. 
of any party other 





vote of the 
amend a rule of that 
and voting (a 
a rule of that house. 
" .. .,, __ ............ ,H. suspension 
membership of each house. 
vote of the 
a joint rule, and a 
temporarily suspend a joint 
the joint rules has been 
suspension has required a 
committees 
and jurisdiction 
of the rules of 
that house. Committee 
to the partisan 
committee would be 
I.J'C'-'uu or select committee or 
house except by a 
that house. Membership on 
made pursuant to Section 
party caucuses. 
and Speaker of the 
to establish and 
subcommittees of the 





be proportional to 
by the party caucuses. 
Section 9925. 












There is no 
to cast a vote for another 
vote or add a vote to the 
the consent of the 
would not allow any vote to 
absence of a quorum, 
are consistent 
an absent member may have 
added to a roll the outcome the vote is not 
rules. 
or her vote 
and there is 
no objection to the 
currently for vote 
quorum of a 
act as an ad 
to the full 
Section 9925 
quorum is present 
to prohibit this 
Section 9926. 
requirements of 
the houses and 
appropriate notice 
the there is no provision 
or adding a vote. 
7 
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less than a 
present to 
and then reports 
not clear whether 





matters relating to 
employee; ( 2) to hear 
, employee , or elected 
to internal house 
to 
to notice in the 
vote, instead of a 
n'I"<:UY\Jr<:>l"' the section 
some circumstances where a four-day 
the Assembly or Senate or 
session. The section is based 
, section more narrowly limits the 
session may be held. Specifically, 
an executive session ( 1) to 
, employment, or dismissal 
or charges brought against an 
public official; (3) to consider matters 
; ( 4) to consider the assignment 
for a conference committee to consider 
Member the Senate or the 
report unless a full and 
been held and would 
a conference report until the report has 
the public for a minimum of two 
this requirement with by a vote of two-thirds 
report adopted in violation of this membership. Any 
provision would be deemed void. 
.5. 
an open, public, noticed meeting 
not clear whether a "full" meeting of 
to be present or that there 
or both. The 
printed evidences a of 
. e. , basically a set 
void suggests that 
deemed not to have been 
attack on any 
the criminal penalty now 
a member at a meeting 
the meeting is held in 
, ir.j unction, or 







Section as it provides for 
deposit of contingent funds 
and for disbursement committees. However, 
Section 9931 would the Senate and the 
Assembly be to the partisan 
composition of otherwise provided by a 
two-thirds vote of the membership of the respective rules committee. 
Funds in the joint contingent fund would be allowed to be disbursed 
only pursuant to a two-thirds vote of the total membership the Joint 
Rules Committee (see Section 9932). Money appropriated for legislative 
printing would be subject to the same of proportionate 
partisan disbursement or a two-thirds vote. There is no present 
requirement of proportionate disbursement and funds are allocated by 
the respective rules committees vote. 
Section 9934. 
Section would 30 days after the adoption 
of the proposition, that funds support the Legislature be reduced 
by an amount to 30 percent the amount appropriated for 
support of the for the 1983-84 fiscal year and thereafter 
would limit the amount appropriated for support of the Legislature to an 
amount equal to that expended for in the prior fiscal year, 
adjusted by the increase or decrease state General Fund spending. 
Section 9935. 
Section 9935 generally recodifies existing Section 9129 
regarding the continuous availability of appropriations deposited in the 
contingent funds. However, the new section would require that 
unexpended funds appropriated for the expenses of a special session 
revert at the end of the session. This provision probably is meant to 
refer only to unencumbered funds in order that funds remaining at the 
end of the session may be used to pay for expenses which accrue (i.e .• 
the funds have been encumbered the expenses) during the session 
but which are not actually paid until after the session ends. 
Section 9936. 
Section 9936 generally recodifies existing Section 9131 which 
requires issuance of an annual public report on the expenditures made 
from the respective contingent funds. In addition, Section 9936 would 
require issuenee of a quarterly report and would add two new 
categories (staff salaries and expenses and third party contracts) to 
the p-~ ?r.c:ntly requlr0d iis. i' c:r.~zed expendii.uH:::~ .. 
9 
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would require the Joint Rules Committee to 
contract an independent audit of the revenues and 
Assembly Contingent Fund, the Senate 
, the Contingent Funds the Assembly and 
Senate. In addition, this section would provide that the organization 
which performs the audit shall be subject to the approval of the Fair 
Political Practices Commission. 
This provision is entirely new. However, it has been the 
past practice of the respective rules committees to contract for an 
independent audit, but the selection of the auditor has never been 
subject to FPPC approval. 
This completes my discussion of the newly add.ed prov1s1ons of 
the measure. As stated at the outset, the measure would also repeal 
certain provisions, namely Sections 9221 to 9223, inclusive, of the 
Government Code which generally require members of the Assembly and 
staff to assist the Speaker in carrying out the duties of the Speaker, 
amount and method of payment for performing certain services, 
and the payment of certain expenses incurred by the Speaker. 





es, 1 i ia 
name is Cindy Simon, senior program director for legislative 
management with the ona1 Con of State Legislatures. I am pleased 
to have the opportunity to appear before you to provide this committee 
with background on legislative es operations similar to those 
addressed in the Gann Ini ve. ifical Y~ I have asked to 
comment on: 
1. whether the requirements which the Gann 
Initiative would impose on the legislature are unique; 
2. the genera i e consti ion ali of imposing 
by initiative statutory restrictions on internal legislative 
management; 
3. the experience other state legislatures in handling some 
of the matters which are addressed in Gann. 
The Gann Initiative is in many ways unique. rst, if approved by the 






first instance in a legislature was forced to 
iled rules of procedure and operations spelled out in 
sed from outside. The two key phrases are 11 Statutorily 
rnally imposed." 
State legislatures operate under three different levels of directives. 
First, there are constitutional mandates regulating such matters as session 
length, legislative officers, general rules for passage of legislation and 
voting, and in some states even matters of legislative compensation. On a 
second level, state legislatures are given by constitution the power to 
determine detailed rules of parliamentary procedure and internal 
legisl ve organization. Rules are matters reserved to the actions and 
consent of each house separately, except in cases of joint rules governing 
transactions between the houses. Finally, in some instances, state 
legislatures pass legislation establishing certain legislative entities or 
processes, for example sunset procedures, statutory committees and staff 
agencies, financial disclosure requirements and open meetings. All of these 
form a of ide1ines which provide the legislative institution with 
a measure certainty, accountability, clarity, order and structure. 
i ative seeks to impose by statute many provisions which 
ly, storically, and constitutionally have been the subject of 
s ative rule. legislative rules are formulated by the members to govern 
the insti on•s operations in a manner which provides flexibility and 
re iti reality. To impose statutory guidelines on such things 
as selection, voting requirements, and management decision-making 






























t th matters e 
re 1 
rnment. 
rat on a 
atur-es 
s in its 
house act alone 
s la 










s ature d not 
content. In is they 
and House 
s cannot 





currently has its 
slature presently 
tion or by any 
r external State constitutions provide for a variety of checks 
and ances between the ree branches of government, and legislators must 
face ul mate test of accountability in their individual elections. 
These are appropriate checks to deal with public perceptions of 
irresponsibility and alleged capriciousness in the legislature. 
Let me turn now to some of the specific provisions delineated in Gann 
and comment on how other state legislatures handle these same matters. 
Whi1 e Gann addresses a variety of issues, I wi 11 primarily focus on 
practices of: 
naming committees. 
voting i rements, and 
1 ocat i staff, funds and other resources proportionately. 
state legislature is encumbered with a committee system delineated 
by r the rules of the 99 legislative bodies provide the 
necessa n ons for organizi and managing committees. 
( committees do exist in a limited number of 
ttees are usually special purpose bodies, 
such as it or sunset committees.) In most 
states, leaders (most often the presiding officer or a committee of 
leaders) determine the size, ratio of majority to minority members, and the 












































s latter category 
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n a 1 slaturet Republicans not always 
only vote th Republicans or Democrats with Democrats. 
ttee appointments juggled or rejuggled 
ing upon whi measure is coming before a 
committee? If not, is there not unequal and therefore 
unconstitutional representation on the committees? 
If so, are the adjustments to be based upon the supposed 
ews of each member, or those of his constituents, or what? 
Plaintiffs' simplistic notions of representation are a poor 
basis for transferring decisions about committees from 
Arizona's House of Representatives to a federal district 
cou • From the beginning of the Republic, and long before, 
now, this kind of decision has been committed 
to 1 islative body involved, whether it be the House 
of Commons, one of the houses of Congress. or one of the 
houses of a state legislature. We are not in a position ••• 
to make better judgment ••• 
me rn now to the matter of voting requirements. The standard for 
1 sl ve actions 1s major1ty vote. State constitutions set out 
instances, example impeachment, emergency acts, or constitutional 
s, re a more st standard such as two-thirds or a 
const1 ority is required. In a few states, for example Arkansas, 
Illi ia, and Delaware, extraordinary majorities are required 
tax matters. To my knowledge, extraordinary majorities are 





s 1 at ve es ire a vote at 
es. In a 
, unan 
rules or 
me turn na11y to question 
legislative resources within a 1 slative 
two- tho el 
r le 
consent is required to 
the division of 
structure 
varies greatly among the s atures· se apportionment 
of staff and other resources rs. In several the largest states, the 
slature is directed managed primary rtisan leaders who are 
responsible for allocation of resources sta For example, in 
party leadership Massachusetts, New York, and Mi gan, 
determines the division resources two parties and the 
staffing pattern for 1 slature. In o, a rong, centralized 
nonpartisan staff serves the 1 Assembly, the ncipal majority_party 
leaders control the di sion of remaining resources within each 
chamber. In other states, for example orida, Connecticut, Washington, 
Kansas and Wisconsin, lea ip committees are si e for the 
determination of sta ng s patterns ther within a single house 
or for both chambers. 
Proportional allocation of resources is required by constitution 
or statute 1n any state 1 slature. In 
ine1y attempt to achieve proporti 
, however, a number of states 
balance in staffing. Personal 
staff commonly are assigned with little regard to party affiliation; and 
because of the predominance of central nonpartisan staffing in most 






same staff resources, 
e, e rank-and-f ie r s 
ea of the four caucuses is 
session staff is apportionned 
and nori es on a ratio approximating party 
balance. Legislative leaders receive same number of staff, regardless 
of party. Another example comes from Wisconsin where ~ersonal staff is 
awarded equally regardless of party affiliation and caucus staffs 
approximate rty strength with some additional allocations to the minority 
staffs. and chairs receive additional staff in recognition for 
their responsibilities, but the number of additional staff is 
• Finally, I would note Pennsylvania, where there is a tradition of 
ng resources sta ly between the two parties. With the 
on the presi officer 1 S account and the offices of the chief 
cle or Senate administration, the majority and minority 
leade p accounts and staffing for committees-are the same. In addition, 
indivi members receive similar allocations. 
As I i i earlier, there is no state legislature which currently 
is statute or consti on to allocate staff resources on a 
1 s. are a few instances. almost exclusively dealing 
oyees» 1 s1ature determines its staffing 
1 a statutory act. , Pennsylvania, has had some 
exper ence a permanent staffing pattern spelled out in statute. In 
1vania Senate leadership reviewed its structure and 
1 was Hincreasingly difficult to utilize 
bility. I speci ty, which seemed desirable when 
it was , has it cult to administer ••• " 
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s 1 ve sta are 
i staff size, degree 
po11 cal tradition. No one 
a var !Ctors 
r, and 
nant 
in 1 states. rthermore. there is no one re s best. 
Whether conscious or ous determi , signi cant trade-offs 
are made between the strengths weaknesses of each • Staff 
increases for committees and members are 11 to result in more 
responsive staff services but • Highly partisan 
staff structures foster a competitive and innovative policy environment, 
but also may result in substantial duplication of sta services. 
Fragmentation and specialization of staff services often go hand-in-hand 
offering subject-matter expertise but compounding management difficulties. 
I would emphasize that there is no best way to organize, manage and 
staff a legislature. Gann -is unique in that it would impose statutory 
restrictions on matters traditionally and appropriately governed by 
legislative rules and determined by the political processes of a 
representative body. 
Let me close by giving you some insights into the deliberations of the 
Legislative Organization and Man~gement Committee of the NCSL. This 
committee currently is focusing on the legislature its relationships 
with various external groups -- citizens, the media, the traditional lobby 
corps, and the other branches of state government. In its initial 
discussions, the committee directed its attention to the uneasy and even 
stormy relationships which have developed recently between legislatures 
and the rapidly proliferating citizen groups. Citizen lobbyists are more 
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numerous more prominent in state 1egisaltive 11s. !~any citizen groups 
have resorted more recently to initiative, referendum and recall to affect 
the goals ich they seek. And the most recent phenomena is that being 
discussed here -- a direct attack through the initiative process on the 
legislative institution. 
It is the committee•s belief that these stormy relationships have 
been brought about by a lack of trust in legislators, a lack of 
understanding of the pluralistic nature of representative government and 
the legislative process 1n particular, and an increasing distance between 
the legislature and the public caused in part by the erosion of the citizen 
legislature. The Legislative Organization and Management Committee is 
attempting to develop some suggestions and strategies for improving 
legislative relations with citizen groups. While that effort is not 
. 
complete, let me leave you with some of the key points which the committee 
has under consideration: 
1 sisze efficiency and effectiveness in legislative operations 
whether in 1-time or part-time legislatures. 
the role of the legislature, and legislative leaders 
cular, in setting the public policy agenda, anticipating 
cri cal issues and formulating timely legislative responses. 
1 Place 1 timate controls on the direct democracy processes of 
initiative, referendum and recall. 
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• r t zen rti on 
1n the legis1 ve i 1n 
government. 
e access ons zen , constituents 
and the public at large. 
t Restore public confi n openness, 
1scip1ine and ethics 1n government. 
t Emphasize institutional needs resources over the desires, wants 























statc;tes, are subject to the restrictions of the California. 
ever b..alf a centt.:rj 
ago, ~ y_._ ZirL11an, 200 Cul. 585 (1927), anC: 11as strongly 
reaff im.eo by t.~e C2liforr:ia Suprer:~e Court c::s recently as last 
September. At that tiw.e tb..e Court held that initiative .statutes 
subject to the sar:1e constitutional liiL~itaticns .•. us are 
other statutes." Legislature .Qf ~ State .Qf Q;liforniG y_._ 
Deukl"lleji_gn, 34 C2l.3d 658, 675 (1983). 
'Ihe Gann Initiative r:ur;;:orts to pror::IQse a statute. It is 
enti tleo tte "Legislative 2eforrn Act of 1983," an6 it is offeree; 
as on a.l1endnent to t.~e Government Co6e, r2.ther than to the 
Constitution. 'Ihe Ga.rm Initiative, therefore, r.,ust confor:.1 to 
the ifornia Constitution. 
'Ihe california Constitution prcvi6es that "ee:ch house" of 
att.:re II es for ;;orcceec.i n t\r t. '1' 
Sec. 7. s .t rovi en is one of t.~e olcest in our r~resent stute 
constitution, to oris;inc.l lEL:9 versicn. In 
, Section ll rxticle 4 of the California Constitution 
touse" 
coiTll':'.i ttees necess.:::rJ for 
" 
The t ut ion L'"l us to e.oc:ch house of the legislature 
auttori t'i to r;i.:cke c:nc to cons-:::itute 
ttees. notice these s arE: net from tte r::o.ver 
to encct stctctes, Cc.l orr:L: Consti t·..:ticr:. :;:rcdcE:s 
can only cor:currer:ce of cot~1 
. B. ::ors·cver: unlike~ 


















Constitution, California Supreme Court expressea these 
commonly held bel r.::aver of the 
legislature to govern i t3 o.m proceedings t..zas so essential to its 
ability to function, that power should be vieved as inherent 
and existing prior to the enact:J~cent of the state Constitution. 
Rejecting a challenge to the inherent po.ver of the Senate to 
investigate ~~arges of bribery, the Court stated: 
"A legislative assembly, v1hen established, becor..es 
vested \vith all the po.-.'ers and privileges which are 
necessary and incidental to a free and unobstructed exercise 
its appropriate functions. These po.vers and privileges 
are derived not from the Constitution; on the contrary, they 
arise from tJ~e very creation of a legislative bocj, and are 
u~n the e self-preservation. The 
Constitution not a grant, but a restriction upon the 
po.-1er of ~~e Legislature, hence an express enUQeration 
of legislative po.vers and privileges in the Constitution 
cannot be considered as the exclusion of others not named 
unless acconpanied OJ negative • A legislative asserrbly 
has, therefore, all the po.vers and privilges Hhich are 
necessary to enable it to exercise in all resr;.ects, in a 
free, intelligent, and irrr~rtial rranner, its appropriate 
functions, except so far as it rr.ay be restrained by the 
sicns of Constitution, or by some express 
, regulating and 1 imi ting the &-rr.<e. 
Law ana Pre.ctice of Legislative i\sser.tblies, p. 221.) 
assembly takes 
ascertained OJ 
. To establi 
In 1905 the California 
its o.m 
, therefore, a legislative 
its creation are to be 
iarnentary la.;'. 
as follo.-Js: . 
es of froceeC:ing. 11 
Court, in revis·1ing the 
inherent Senc:.te to s for r:-clfeasance in 
office, reaffi holCi "'The consti tcticn 
that D.t:e the n:le of its 
proceeding, anC concurr2nce of b.JC thircs of all 
the s ' (Const., art. IV sec. 9.) 
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house of Congress 11not only such fO,Yers as are 
to th~~ by Constitution, but 
to 
tla:irain Y...... Ceugberty, 273 u. 
necessary and appropriate 
of investigation 
contempt. The United 
to conclude that "Congress not 
Houses, of and inherent 











e):tenGed." .In~ d1afijlan, 166 U.S. 661, 671-72 {l8S7). See J..\J.r:lli::t 
y_._ ;:aceracl<s:.n, 294 u.s. 125, 151 (1935). 
Tnese priniciples of consti tl::tional interpretation are 
2 
widely shared by California's sister states. But although they 
are widely hela, one might object that it is equally universal 
fer state legislatures, including the California legislature, to 
pass statutes, rather than n.J.es, to govern their am proceaures. 
Toe argument might thus be rre.ae that if these inherer:t f'OIJers can 
be gcverr:ed ty statute, then the] are not constitutionally 
inviolate. 
Toe problem with this arc;ument is that it overlooks the fact 
~~at each house of a legislature must concur before a statute is 
passed. Tnus when a legislature enacts a statute that governs its 
o:m internal proceeG.ings, it is as if each house has separately 
passea a corresponding rule of interrzl procedure. Proceoural 
statutes uay ttus be vie.·1ea as simply another form of such 
unicameral rules. 
Statutes governing interal procedure have in fact been 
interpreted in this r;-anner. In 1896, for exarnple, the Court of 
P.p}Jeals of the District of ColLZ'bie. considered 2 challenge to .:1 
statute proviaing the.t if a Hitness refused to c:nsrler questions 
W1 investigatins ccr.nittee of tl:':e Uniteo St.::t;::.::: S<::nc:te, 
2 
See. ~.., O;,=>ir .. ic.n oi t.hs_ J~ t:o. 1£1:, 179 So.2c 155, 158-
59 (P~.::. 1965); ~J.lri y_._ Atteroury,. 300 s.~'.2d D06. 810 (::o. 
1957); J.Qry. y_._ 1:£-;rtin, 56 P.2d 1093 .. 1005 (Cr. 1936); Tcr.r.ell y_._ 
:\ing, 14 S.\·.J.2d 786, 78S-90 (Te}:. 192S); St:at.s; ,ex .r.cl.. .. ~d.hlD.S.9D 
y_._ Fluent, 191 P.2d 241 (T!c:sh.), ga_t_._ ('s;niei,i, 335 U.S. 84L1 
(1942); R.K. Gooch, Legal r::e.ture oi Legislc:::tive 2ules of 






















11'I'"ne princi:t;le, that each brcnch of a legislative assffiJ)lj' 
hc!s a ri sb t to c.ete e<:i ne its a,m rcl es, is deer.1ec so 
im];Vrtant th.::t <.vbere it insertec in the consti tutien of a 
StiJte, it has been ooubted, lvhetber it \·laS COITlf:€tent for the 
legislature of such State, by law, to provide n.:les for the 
soverr:J:ler.t of its resr.::ective branches, 1.vhich shoulC. bind 
them and super seC:e their authority to make rules for 
therJsel ves. " 
(2d ed. 1866), at 247. ~ ~. at 311. 
Loaern a.uthori ty reaches the S2Jl.e conclusion in a more 
mqualifieC. r.,anner. For example, Izson' s r;anual .Qf Ls;c:jslat.iY..e 
Proce~.:u..r.s; (1979}, Hhich is specifice:lly incor1.::-.orated ty both the 
5 
Senate Rules and t.1.e 'I'e'lp:nary Joint Rules, flatly asserts that 
"The house and senate rr.ay pass an internal Of€rating rule of its 
cwn procecure t.1.at is in conflict uith a statute fomerly 
aacptec." ~. at 36. 
Although, as you might ir.1agine, there have not been r:.any 
cases in \vhich this issue as .::riser., there are a fed, anC: thE:y 
arE: consistent uith S;:-:..wn_'_s ;:osition. In 1075, i:or <::::a::lf.:le, the 
Georc:;ia Supre'Tie Co.:· . ~: c that ei tber 1-:.ouse of the lesislature 
coulC: b:zr interna.l rule OJ err ice Georsic.' s ".Sur1shine LcH .-" which 
prov.:cec ~h2t certain corrmi ttee i:!eetinss b2 or:en. Cos:cin h. 
~'" 211 S. C.2c. 708 (C::. 1S7 . The Court state<i oluntly that 
'";;e r,ot C€lieva. thc.t it c:n ree:sonably be arguec tb.at the 
I:olise or 2er:e:te cunr:ot ;;~ss an interr.::::.l opcrc::tins rl:le for its 
o.m ;rocecures i±at is 1n cor.flict \lith a st.:::tute ;.:orr.'erl~' 
ene:ctec •. 11 Ic. c::t 710-ll. 
Sirtlilarly: the Su:t're.l-:1e: Ju6icial Court of :2ssc:chusetts 
5 













comni ttees are to be selected. :Jut the p:Aver to select such 
coiT!Eli ttees is 2;-:;;;lici tly given to each house:: 0:1 Section 11 of 
.A..rticle 4 of the state consti tt..:.tion, c.nd it is in c.ny event 
iq::lici t in the: txAJer giver: to each house by Section 7 to "ac1opt 
n:J.es for its procoedngs. 11 This p:wer is directly impaired by 
Section 9922 of the Gann Initiative. 
Other important provisions of tte Gann Initiative also 
conflict \vith the consti tuticnal paver of each house of the 
legislature to the adopt its o.m rules and select its o.m 
committees. The Initiative, for example, defines and establishes 
P.ules Committees in both the Assembly and the Senate; it 
establishes the f:O.vers of these Rules Committees and sets out the 
voting requirements a~purtinent thereto. (Sections 9911, 9Sl2, 
9915, 9916) • In the most obvious ];X)SSible munner, these 
;;;rovisicns directly restrain the Senate an(; the Asser.lbly from 
alteri their am rLJ.es cf proceeding or selecting their o.·m 
P.ules Comnittees in a r.anner inconsistent the Gar~ Initiative. 
If the legislature were to .:::~ttempt to enact a statute 
er:-bodting the reforr.s of the Gc.nn Initiati·Je, such a stc:tde \;oulc 
D€ ic to t..':e extent tl:at eac..': house votes, in effect, to ar::enC:: 
its r~les in conformit'i \lid1 t.'"le stntute. 2ut then each house 
coulc., b:z· .:: ur:ilnter.:;l chans;e in its intcrllC:l rdesl .:;lter the 
is not the c:::.sc:, 
Ganr, ,... tive. 
of ever~ cot!: ho~ses of 
Initiative is cz.llec; into quest:ion ~7 Art. 2, Sec. 10 cf the 













2t statute or a 
Section 8. 'The 
ules" frcm 





cannot. Statutes r.tust 
or cS.i sapproval; 





























IXJ<Jer can be curtaileo only 
by an i tiative pro;;;osing a oonsti tutional ur.:ench!er.t. Sir:ce the 
Gar1I1 Initiative c.:Oes not pro_t:ose such cG1 .J::1encment, <:::r.(i since it 
insteao clearly ~xor.:oses the kind of "rdes 11 tl:at the 
Constitution auttcrizes each house of ti;e legislature se~arately 
to acq:,t, h: follo..;s tha.t the Gann Initiative i~" not autl·:orize6 
Section 8. 
Finally, I woulc observe that this conclm>ion is bt.1ttresse6 
UJ the recent decision of the Supre~tte Judicial Court of 
~:.asschusetts in Paisner y_,_ P_j:torc~y GeneraL 458 i\l. E.2d 734-
. 1983). The ~:.::ssachusetts Constitution, like the C.:-:liforni.:: 
tc:ticn provides for an initiative process in Hhich the 
e can prot_:::ose c:l 11 Consti tuticnal amendnent or lc:H. 11 The 
I-!assachusett:s Consti tuticn, like t.l-te Californic, Consti tuticn, 
also gives to each of its legislative houses the ro.;er to 
oeterrdne its am interr:al rules of proceeding. In Paisncr the 
Suprerae Judicial Court 0etermined thc:t an initiative \vhicl.1 
attempted to alter these internal rules of prcceedins in a mnner 
similar to the Gann Initic:tive \H:.s unconstituticn<:l. 'The Court 
reasoned such an initiative \':us oonstituticnally 
mc.uti:.or i eecau.se "rules" rc.ther thatl 11 lai."S. II It 
ccncl t "the r:..:lcs of f:..:tL:re sessions of the [ouse or 
cz.nnot w.c~c-r the tl!ticn i.x: cor.trolL:d" by c: 
sa..-:1e concl L!S i en c ob t2i n ur: c.c r C.: J. if crr,i o 
Consti tcticn ':lith res}?ect to t.ic:ti·Je. 
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The California slature is suffering from a serious crisis 
in public confidence. Lawmakers are perceived by many voters as 
arrogant big spenders who are more sted in gaining reelection 
than in serving the s of 
on 24 on the June , the led Gann Initiative, 
will go a long way toward re publ confidence the Legis-
lature and returning us to a where lawmakers represent not 
themselves, but the e of i a. 
Perhaps it is dif ult for anyone than a tted obser-
ver of the Legis to understand how an ini ative which deals 
with issues such as sl ttees and 2/3rd vote require-
ments can help make the slature represent the people again. 
I have come here today as a member of the Legislature to offer 
my observations on why the California islature is sore in need 
of reform and why the lie ition 24. 
Proposition 24 has four main goals: 
1. Cut The first goal is to reduce le-




Even some of the itiative's most vocal opponents admit that 
legislative spending has reached absurd proportions. There are vir-
tually no checks on legis spending and there is far too little 
public scrutiny of how the Legislature is spending the taxpayers' 
money. 
Since 1978, the Legislature has more than doubled its budget --
this is equal to three times the increases enjoyed by the rest of 
state government and by our schools. The Legislature now spends 
$1 million annually per legislator. 
The Gann Initiative would re~uire an immediate 30 percent cut 
slative spend , returning to 1978 levels after adjusting for 
inflation. Any future ~ ~ increases could be no higher than 
the yearly increase in the state's General Fund. 
2. Curb spending abuses. The second goal of the Gann Initia-
tive is to require major spending decisions to be made in the open 
with a hearing and vote. Perhaps the worst spending abuses now taking 
place in the Legislature are the private consulting contracts the 




These contracts include a $600,000 to $800,000 open-ended con-
i paid to a high-priced San Francisco attorney. Among other 
attorney was paid to fight the Sebastiani initiative and 
rtionment referendum -- measures initiated by taxpayers. 
ght now, one man's signature is enough to unleash tens of 
thousands of dollars for "consulting" contracts. Contracts are awarded 
in secret, with no public hearing or committee vote, and are often 
for part- services yielding no written report of the work per-
present stem of secrecy encourages abuse. 
-?-
Under the ons 
could be awarded wi 
3. 
the initiative is to guarantee publ 
cess. These •sunshine• provisions 
tradition of requiring a 2/lrds vote 
rules 
it no contr~cts 
vote. 
The third goal of 
access to 1 slative pro-
lude a return to the 130-year-olc 
suspensions of legislative 
The public's and ~he news media's only hope of keeping track 
of what the Legislature is up to lies in rules and procedures 
which by law ve are supposed to follow. But the present leadership 
decided to throw out the old system and allow just a bare majority 
to suspend the rules. The result is that rules which govern whether 
a bill must have a hearing and how long in advance the public must 
be notified of the hearing can be easily suspended. 
The Gann Initiative would restore the tradition of requiring 
a 2/3rds vote for rule suspension. It also would prevent •end runs" 
around the process of publ hearings and debate which can now be 
accomplished through the infamous conference committee process. 
These reforms at least give the public a fighting chance of keeping 
an eye on the shenanigans politicians are likely to 11 when there 
are no procedural rules. 
4. Make the Legislature The fourth, 
and the most important goal of the Gann Initiative, is to reduce the 
power the Speaker now has to distort islative proces; through 
absolute control of the committee system. At present, islation 
which would be supported by a majori of legislators if it made it 
to the floor, is frequently kil in committee. 
-3- -142-
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Yhe Speaker, through his sol~ and absolute power to appoint all 
committee chairmen and ~embers, frequently stacks committees with 
persons representing a minority view. The committee process is thus 
used to rob the voters of a truly representative forum for the debate 
of issues. We have in a sense a tyranny of the minority controlling 
the Legislature. 
The Gann Initiative would effect several changes designed to 
make the Legislature more representative. Under Gann, no single 
legislative member would have the inordinate power, now possessed 
by the Speaker, to pass or kill legislation. Instead, most powers 
would be placed in bi-partisan Senate and Assembly Rules Commitees. 
These committees would assign all bills to committee, appoint commit-
tee chairs and vice-chairs and allocate funds and staffing propor-
tionally, instead of on the basis of political favoritism. 
Just these modest changes would release the committee system 
from the tight grip of the powerful sp~aker, thereby making it more 
likely that legislation the people want receives a full public de-
bate and vote. 
The charge by those opposed to the initiative is that its re-
would somehow give the minority party the power to block all 
legislative action, thereby destroying the •maJority rules" systeffi. 
This charge is hardly substantiated. A majority vote is required to 
pass laws in the Legislature. This would in no way change under the 
Gann Initiative reforms. 
Also, it should be noted that when the founding fathers set up 
a •majority rules" system, they did not envision oppression by the 
majority and specifically set down safeguards against such oppression. 
Rules protect the minority and preserve the minority's rights. Abrahar 
-4-
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Lincoln spoke of a •majority held in restraint by Constitutional checks 
and limitations" and Thomas Jefferson said •though the will of the 
majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful, must 
be reasonable.• Majority rule does not mean granting the majority a 
license to do as it pleases. And yet this is the system under which 
the California Legislature is now operating and which the present 
leadership defends. 
Yhe primary •ignificance of the Gann Initiative is that it 
addresses an urgent question being asked acre and aore frequently: 
To whaextent does the state Legislature really represent California 
anymore? The evidence speaks strongly to the fact that the Legisla-
ture is controlled by politicians fundamentally out of step with the 
concerns and beliefs of most Californians. 
Perhaps the best evidence that this is true is the fact that 
most major changes in government policy in the last six years have 
come from the people by initiative;not the Legislature. Proposition 
13, capital punishment, the repeal of the inheritance tax, the Victims 
Bill of Rights, all contained measures which were first prevented 
from becoming law by the current legislative leadership. This 
caused a frustrated populace to take matters into its own hands. 
Proposition 13, the historic tax-cutting measure, was the first 
major rejection by the people of the tax-and-spend agenda advocated 
by the present legislative leadership. The Victims' Bill of Rights 
was a collection of tough-on-crime laws bottlenecked for years by the 
Assembly Criminal Justice Committee at the Speaker's behest. The 
people also rejected the cynical gerrymandering of election districts 
by the present ~eadership when they threw out the Legislature's 
reapportionment plans two years ago. 
-144-
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Row, as an election again draws near, the Cann Initiative has 
surfaced, more than anything else, as a reaction to the growin9 con-
viction that the California Legislature no longer represents the 






DANIEL H LOWENSTEIN 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Los Angeles, May 4, 1984. 
My name is Daniel H. Lowenstein. I am a 1 a\.".1 essor at 
Previously I have served as Deputy Secretary of State of 
California and chairman of the Fair Political Practices 
Cc:mmi ssi on. 
By creating today's forum for discussion of the pros and 
cans of Proposition 24, the Senate Judiciary Committee provides 
an important service to the people of California. To the e>:tent 
such meetings encourage the news media to report the informatio~ 
and arguments relating to ballot measures prominently and on a 
regular basis~ we may diminish the importance of overwhelming 
campaign spending in initiative campaigns. 
Many lawyers believe, with good reason, that Proposition 24 
will be declared unconstitutional if adopted. In my testimony, 
however, I shall assume for the sake of argument that it is 
constitutional and will go into effect if it is approved. 
I am opposed to Proposition 24 because I believe its main 
thrust is an assault on the principle of majori rule, and a 
handing over of more power and influence to special interests. 
I~ both these respects, Proposition 24 will devalue the votes of 
individual Californians. 
Proposition 24 is an assault on majori rule because it 
c1vides effective power so closely between the two major parties 
that it will make relatively little difference which party wins 
2n election. This will reduce the responsibility of the 
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majority party to the electorate, since they cannot be blamed for 
what they do when their majority status does not give them 
effective control of the legislature. 
Many observers of contemporary American government, and 
California government in particular, are concerned by the 
inability of parties to offer meaningful programs to the public, 
to be held accountable for the success or failure of those 
programs, and thereby to encourage the active participation in 
politics by the voters. 
this problem worse. 
In my opinion, Proposition 24 will make 
Proposition 24 will improve the position of powerful special 
interest groups in two distinct ways. First, it will do so by 
its indiscriminate cuts in the legislative budget. There are 
abu5es in legislative spending, particularly in the employment by 
both parties of individuals chosen for their campaigning skills 
rather than their expertise in public policy questions. Over 
the years the legislature has reduced the magnitude of these 
abuses, although it has not eliminated them. But nothing in 
Proposition 24 guarantees that it will have the slightest effect 
on the abuses. Faced with hard choices about which staff 
meffibers to cut, legislators, who are not saints, may well choose 
to save the most politically valuable individuals at the expense 
of ~hose with high substanti~e proficiency. 
should this be of great concern to the average citizen? 
islators do not have the time themselves to become experts on 
most of the complex matters they deal with. They have to rely 




is a commonplace to obse~ve that the interests ~ 
lobbyists in Sac~amento a~e ext~emely dive~se, but these 
interests are not ~epresented 1 y. The vast majori 
by 
of 
lobbying expenses are incu~red in behalf of specialized groups 
such as business, the p~ofessions, labor and agriculture. 
There is absolutely nothing wrong with these groups 
asserting their interests, but these interests sometimes conflict 
with those of the average citizen. Who can provide the 
citizen~s side of the sto~y, to balance the presentation of the 
lobbyists? All too often the only answer is a legislative staff 
membe~. If Proposition 24 is adopted, that staff member 
p~obably won~t be there. 
The second ~eason P~oposition 24 is a bonanza for special 
interests is that it d~astically weakens the power of the 
leadership. Special inte~est groups can use campaign 
cont~ibutions and other methods to bring eno~mous p~essu~e to 
bea~ on the legislature. It takes powe~ to countermand such 
power. A strong speake~ and president pro tern can often stand 
up to the special interests, when individual legislators cannot. 
Those who believe the power of special inte~ests could not 
possibly be greate~ than it is may be in for an unpleasant shock 
if P~oposition 24 passes. 
Suppo~te~s of P~oposition 24 seem to belieive the leadership 
has dictatorial powe~ ave~ the individual membe~s. This point 
of view ignores the fact that the leade~s hold their positions at 
the mercy of the individual membe~s of thei~ own party in the 
1 egi slat Lire. The recent histo~y of both parties in both houses 
demonst~ates that this is no hypothetical co~straint on the 
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leadership. 
Proposition 24 does have some good points. 
these are the financial disclosure provisions. 
Foremost among 
In addition, a 
selective pruning of the legislative budget could undoubtedly be 
accomplished in a beneficial way, but as I stated earlier, 
Proposition 24 uses a meat axe where a scalpel is needed to do 
any good. Overall, and by a wide margin, the harm Proposition 
24 will cause outweighs the minor benefits. 
It is natural that those in and around the legislature will 
be preoccupied with the immediate effects of Proposition 24. 
Which party will gain and which will lose? Who will gain in 
power? And so on. 
But the rest of us will be living with Proposition 24 for a 
long time, and we had better look at what it will do to our 
system of government over the long run. Proposition 24 is well-
intentioned and has a few good provisions, but its overall impact 
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PROPOSITION 24 - THE TYRANNY 
May 4, 1 
Newspaper bylines have described Proposition 24: "Gann is At It Again," 
"How to Wreck the Legislature," "Voter Trick or Treat?" and "Tyranny or 
'imply put, the initiative seeks, among other things to reduce what the 
legislature can spend on itself by 30% and to overthrow the normal 
rules of lawmaking to give small minorities a veto over the legislative 
process. 
On the first topic, how much money the Legislature spends on itself, 
Gann has hit a sensitive nerve because everybody knows that whatever it 
is, is probably too much. In fact, it constitutes only 1/2 of 1% of 
the total state budget and has not increased 30% over inflation in the 
past seven years as Gann says it has. 
Further, in 1981, in a ranking of state legislatures, California was 
27th in expenditures based on dollars of per capita personal income 
among the 50 states. California is frequently referred to in textbooks 
and periodicals as top, along with New York, in overall legislative 
quality. 
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men ha>e on this green earth." 
Su~an B Anthony 
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That quality is directly related to the 2,200 employees who now toil in 
Sacramento helping legislators analyze and understand the complex forces 
affecting school financing, medical care, agri-business, criminal 
justice, the environment and other aspects of a complex society. In 
short, California has one of the best legislatures in the country 
because it hires a research capability at least equal to that of the 
executive branch. And this is the legislative budget that would take 
the draconian cut should Gann pass. 
is controvers i 1/2 of 1% also pays for legislators' district and 
Sacramento office staff whose most important function is communicating 
with constituents. Se~ator Mello has told AAUW that his office receives 
r s ds to 5, p~eces of ,ail a year. He requires each 1etter 
within you believe that if a 30% cut were 
it ause no legislator wou d cut off the 
bl reei c i v ~e gt the turn around time for 
ans\1\er i g cor:s t rs, if o~ce exists. And it does. 
t is f at would take tne entire 30% 
s r : t for 
ic r' ,, _, ;sts and special ~t2rests. 
,~02 sec v(td '-• ct. \ (I ~~ f,::::.. ~' '-..'·\!'¥ 1:: t ap int COtlliTii tteE: ers from ·. ' ,,,_ c 
' :y ~ -· es ttt:e a '31 ving it to - r •. 
t <"' <?qui ri vi tua l ly al 1 Rules ~ it tee votes 1-' r,:..;c,<,es, ,, 
s e tc et t e twc-.~ rds t~st c ct:rns us. The result 
'wOU 1 d uf no ca•JC s wouid virtually 
s Lie. lf" could CGntrol 
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the Senate, if you control eight of its members, since there are 15 
Republican ~enators and eight make a majority of their caucus. 
They appoint two of the five members of the ~enate 0 u1es Committee where 
all expenditures require a two-thirds vote. When the two minority 
members of Rules fail to vote the caucus way, they can be replaced with 
two who will. Thus the minority could stymie the entire legislative 
process by refusing to allow bills to be heard, not to mention passed, 
refusing to approve payment of an errant Senator's office expenses, 
refusing to authorize staff for unpopular committees, etc. 
If the legislative Analyst characterized the Governor's budget as the 
"Property Tax Increase Act of 1984,n the Republican caucus could halt 
the printing of future analyses and refuse to pay the Analyst•s staff. 
The Auditor General could be kept from conducting an audit. All members 
of the legislative staff, the Legislative Analyst, Legislative Counsel, 
Auditor General. perhaps even the chaplain would have political loyalty 
oaths. 
In short, the reforms of Proposition 24 are more accurately described 
as a system of minority tyranny. It would institutionalize partisanship 
in the day to day operation of the Legislature. Decision making would 
shift to the party caucuses and the caucus agenda would become the 
legislature's agenda. That is of great concern to AAUW because party 
caucuses do not hold open meetings. 
In the highly regarded California Public Administration, a publication 
of the California Journal. the observation is made, "Political parties 
-152-
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are weak in California. There is no stong party discipline that 
determines how members of the Legislature will vote on any issue. 
Party positions are rarely taken on bills, and the legislators vote 
more in accordance with the views of their constituents and their own 
consciences than with the views of party leaders." AAUW members are 
anxious to keep it that way, regardless of which party is the majority. 
The position of the American Association of University Women is based 
on legislative policy that supports open and democratic decision making 
and improvement of governmental structure. These policies are adopted 
at our state convention by delegates of our 33,000 member California 
e :Jivis on. 
WEST COAST RBGION, NAACP 
975 Sutter 
Suit I 
San Francisco, CA. 
94115 
415-931-3243 
May 4, 1984 
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members. 
APPENDICE G 
My name is Henry Dotson, and I am the Vice-President of the 
Southern Area Conference of NAACP branches. Today, I will be 
reading for you a statement prepared by Mrs. Virna M. Canson, who 
is, as I am sure you know, the Director of the Western Region, 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Mrs. 
Canson sends her greetings to the Joint Committee, her thanks for 
being invited to testify and her regrets that scheduling 
conflicts preclude her being present at this hearing. 
You may be interested to know that NAACP and the National 
Urban League are convening a National Summit on the State of the 
Black Family at Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee, May 
3-Sth. Mrs. Canson is attending this important meeting. 
If the people of California fail to examine the Gann 
initiative in the broad context or fail to relate it to an 
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insidious, pervasive drive by well financed, right wingers to 
capture the governing processes of our Republic, we will hand 
over to this destructive element the power to paralyze our 
legislature. 
As I prepared for this presentation, each time I reviewed 
Proposition 24, another frightening aspect became apparent. 
The first question I had to ask myself, and I also ask you 
and Mr. Gann is, "Would there be a Proposition 24 if the speaker 
of the Assembly were a white man?" 
Far too many people will seek to avoid raising that question 
even though in their consciousness, just as in mine, the piercing 
question lies. We would all do well to recognize the presence of 
this aspect of Gann's offensive. 
It is not enough to examine Gann from the technical, legal 
perspective. Gann must be viewed within the context of attempts 
to diffuse the power of the grass roots. In addition, this 
initiative cannot be separated from recent efforts to affect the 
s ive reapportionment process. Even the current efforts of 
Gann's partner, Howard Jarvis, in further tying the hands of 
local government through his "Jaws IV", are a part of the right 
wing, moral majority effort to disrupt representative government. 
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Indeed, we appear to be moving away from representative 
government. Are we on a path that will end with the destruction 
of our Republic? 
Will we be left with a form of "minority" rule through 
license to obstruct? If so, racial minorities, women and others 
will see their hopes dashed and rights eradicated. 
We in the NAACP, despite the many difficulties we face, 
historically and presently carry on our work with faith in the 
processes of the judicial, legislative and administrative arms of 
government. We have felt, and still feel, that our petitions for 
redress in these areas have at least a fair chance. 
Blacks have been willing to take their chances with the 
established forms of government. Where we saw a.n unjust law, we 
put our best efforts forward to change that law because we felt 
that, in most instances, a votP of the majority of the members of 
a given house would support our petitions for change. Never did 
we expect to encounter statutorily sanctioned obstruction of the 
will of the majority vote of the Legislature. 
Unfortunately, the initiative process in California has lost 
its historical meaning. It has been the experience of NAACP that 
constitutional rights of minorities are placed before the 
electorate by vested, economic interests. As an example, 
-3-
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Proposition 14 in housing and Proposition 1 in equal educational 
opportunities. 
Why should a political party unable to elect a majority in 
the Assembly or Senate use its super-rich resources and computer 
created populations to continue to obstruct the representative 
form of government? Honesty is no longer a component of the 
initiative process. Money and computers are creating false 
illusions while more and more people are turning their backs and 
leaving the electorial process to fewer and fewer people. 
Registration statistics in California reflect a continuing 
advantage for the Democratic Party. However, Republicans do win 
elections. Gann, Sebastiani, and that wing of the Republican 
rty, pose a threat to Republican victories in a much more 
devastating way than "heads up" competition from Democrats. 
Having a majority already in California, would not it seem only 
logical that should Proposition 24 pass, the strategy of the 
Democrats would move toward assuring that there existed in both 
the Assembly and Senate a two-thirds majority? Is this the kind 
of arrangement that is best for the two-party system and the 
citizens of California? 
We think not. 
-4-
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It is for the reasons I have set serious threat 
to the two-party system; the costly obstruction of the will of a 
majority of the slature: in on s of the 
citizens and representative government--that the NAACP vigorously 




Members of the 
My name is I 
APPENDICE H 
before you on behalf 
of California Women Lawyers, and I thank you this 
opportunity for comment on the Gann 
California Women Lawyers a statewide bar association. 
It has nineteen affiliate local women's bar associations as well 
as individual members and represents the interests of the 
thousands of women lawyers throughout the State of California. 
As lawyers, we cannot help but have a profound interest 
in the legislative process. I am here today to express to you 
California Women Lawyers' concerns regarding the impact of the 
Gann initiative, if adopted, on the integrity and effectiveness 
of our legislative processes. 
We have four areas of particular concern. 
First, we are concerned with the various provisions of 
the Gann initiative that would require 2/3 votes of the Assembly 
Rules Committee, the Senate Rules Committee and the Joint Rules 
Committee. A 2/3 vote would be required, as we understand it, 
for any decisions regarding expenditure of funds or distribution 
of resources, including hiring or dismissing staff. A 2/3 vote 
would be required to establish special or select committees and 
subcommittees as well as joint committees. And a 2/3 vote of the 
Assembly Rules Committee would be required to confirm statutory 
appointments to commissions and the like made by the Speaker of 
the Assembly. 
These 2/3 vote requirements, although directed toward 
-1-
-159-
matters, would have an inevitable substantive effect. 
Much the important that has been adopted in recent 
years to provide equal opportunity for and address the special 
needs of women and minorities has emerged from committee reports 
and investigations into these problems and needs. We are talking 
about lls affecting a variety of economic issues, family 
issues, and rights bills affecting the social treatment of 
women and the family and of other underrepresented persons. 
These ls vary from pay and workplace protections to laws 
regarding community projects, spousal and child support and child 
care. They include nursing home legislation and criminal law 
re , as well as business, education, social care programs and 
budgetary issues. 
Often bills address these issues are the product of 
sta hired for these particular purposes and of the efforts of 
1 and select committees and certainly major legislation 
not be carr through without such staff. If the staff is 
not , if the are not funded, if the committees are 
not established, the stion whether bills address the 
concerns women should be adopted will be moot. Such bills 
1 never be dra 
vote. Cali 
will never reach the floor for a 
1 not maintain its posture as one of the 
most states the union, a model for the country and 
ly to the fabric of this state. 
So what the problem requiring a 2/3 vote of the 
Committees to such efforts? The problem is that 
-2-
s 
, but rare 2 
has garnered 
votes. Thus the 2/3 vote 
historically 
majority 
requirements the Gann as a 
procedural to obstruct and progress. cer-
tainly create the potential by a small number of 
3 of the can ~ffectively committee members. A mere 
veto efforts at change at very inception by vetoing alloca-
tion of funds, appointment of staff and establishment of the 
necessary committees. 
A second major problem with the Gann initiative is its 
requirement that the two rna have equal representation 
on the Rules Committees, regardless of these parties' propor-
tionate overall representation within the Legislature. If 30% of 
the Senate are members of one and 70% are members of 
another, the Gann initiative would nonetheless require that 50% 
of the Senate Rules Committee come from each. This requirement 
clearly undercuts the people's to effectuation of their 
vote. It also freezes out third 
gether. The potential negative 
representatives alto-
of such a requirement is 
particularly important given the tremendous control that the 
Rules Committees have over procedural matters. 
Third, the partisan theme of the Gann initiative, speci-
fically the requirements that members of the various Senate, 
Assembly and Joint committees be selected by the party caucuses, 
encourages polarization along party Moderates who do not 
toe the party line are subject to shment. The 
-3-
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caucus will remove or withhold them from membership on 
des committees. the caucuses cannot help but 
the ability s to address individual issues 
of •s platform and to move from one side 
to the other according to the merits of particular proposed 
legislation. Measures of concern to women are often passed by 
moderate vote and compromise -- both Democrats and Republicans 
on social good. When there is block voting, important 







Finally, the overall effect of the numerous new proce-
that the Gann initiative would impose -- particularly 
the Rules Committees on numerous detailed decisions --
to make the slature a less efficient entity and 
influence -a-vis the Executive branch, which has 
advantage ultimate decisionmaking by a 
J. Ours is a delicate structure of checks and 
the three branches of government. CWL has long 
about in the power of the 
We look to the Legislature to pay attention to 
sues. We to the as well as male represen-
the is and on legislative committees to 
addres these concerns We to preserve the openness now 
the lature to introduce measures of concern to 




dialogue on key measures. One 
structure that enhances this effort 
members more than any other branch of govern-
-4-
- h?-
ment are in contact the The Gann 
initiative's 
legislative and 
effect on the balance of power between the 
branches, , should not 
be disregarded or taken 1 
-163- -5-





CALifORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION IS 
APPENDICE I 





BUT I AM HERE TODAY BECAUSE WHAT AFFECTS THE ISJ...ATURE 
ULTlMAT!LY AFFECTJ OUR PUBLIC 
AND OUR PUBLIC SCHOOl TEACHERS~ 
CALl~lk EDUCA"ltOLFUNDING 
THE POSITION THE CALIFORNIA 
SCHOOL STUDENTS., 
NOW WHEN 80% OF 
DIRECTLY fROM SACRAMENTO. 
AssociATION ON THIS 
ISSUE IS CLEAR S1MPL£: WE OPPOSE tT. REASO~ ARE MORE 
COMPlEX. 
ON A PHlLOSOPHJCAl LEVEL4 WE OPPOSE THE PURPORTED REFORM 
BECAUSE IT WOUlD VIOLATE OUR GO'II!RNMEN.TAL 
SVST!M--THE CONCEPT THE GUISE OF GIVING 
A SECONDARY PARTY A GREATER SAY IN ISLATIVE MATT£RS.t THE GANN 
INITIATIVE WOULD ACTUAlLY GIVE THE SMALlER PARTY THE POWER TO BLOCK 
DECISIONS MADE BY A MAJORITY TYRANNY OF THE FEW WOULD 
BE THE ORD!R OF DAY l F PROPOS ON 24 TO BEeOME LAWJ AND 
TH! TYRANNY OF TH! f!W FUNDAME~TAL PRlNClPl! 
Of MAJORITY RULE. 
OUR !NTIR! WAY OF GOVERNMENT INESS REVOLVES AROUND 
THE PR!HlS~THAT A MAJORITY SHOUtD HAVE RJGHT TO MAKE THE 
HOST IMPOtrrANT DEClStONS~ BUT PROPOSITION 24 WOULD ALSO SUB&tllut! 
PROPORTlDNAllTV FOR MAJORITY RULE IN ISSUES RELATING T~ lEGISLATIVE 










IS EtECTEn PRESIDENT 
.~ EVEN IF JUST 
, No ONE SUGGEST~ 
PROPORTIONAlLYJ WITH THE 
DECLARE ITS CANDIDATE 
SOMETHING SIMILAR.~ !STAB-
POWER AND RESOURCESJ 
IT WOUlD LIMIT THE POWER 
THE PROCEDURES FOR THE 
PARTY THE POWER NOT 
CAUCUS POLITICS TO 
COMMITtEES~ WHlLE CURRENT 
MEMBERS ON THE ASSEMBLY 
THE SENATE SIDE~ PROPOSITION 24 
ISI HANDS OF THE CAUCUSES. 
CAUCUSES RATIFlCATlON 
AS WHOlES~ WOULD DRIVE 





RU~EA ESPECiAlLY WHERE 
DECISIONS AffECTING 
OUR STUDENTS.., 
TEACHERS WE REPRESENT~ 
3-3-3-3 
NOT ONLY WOULD PROPOSITION 24 WEAKEN THE PRINCIPLE OF MAJORITY 
RULE~ IT WOULD ALS~ POTE~TJAtLV DISENFRANCHISE FROM THE POWERFUL 
RulES COMMrTTEES ANY VOTERS WHO HAD PUT INTO OFFICE A REPRESENTATIVE 
WHO IS NOT A MeMBER OF THE TWO MAJOR PARTIES. BECAUSE~ UNDER GANN~ 
TH!S! APPOINTMENTS WOULD BE MADE BY THE POliTICAL PARTIES INDEPEN-
DENTLY AND WllHOUT CHECK~ SUCH AN INDEPENDENT OR THIRir PARTY MEMBER 
WOULD HAVE VIRTUALLY NO CHANCE OF SECURING ONE OF THESE IMPORTANT 
AND POWERFUL POSITIONS. 
BECAUSE OF THE POWER OF THE RULES COMMITTEES TO AFFECT THE 
FATES OF BILLSJ THIS WOULD SUGGEST SUCH A REPRESENTATIVE'S CON-
STITUENTS MIGHT FIND THEIR INTERESTS lESS PROTECTeD. 
EQUALLY TELLING IS THE EFFECT ON OUR SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND 
BALANCES THAT PROPOSITION 24 WOULD HAVE. OUR STATE CONSTITUTION 
CONCENTRATES A GREAT DEAl OF POWER IN THE EXEEUTlVE BRANCH~ AND 
MORE PRECISELY~ IN THE GOVERNOR. BUT THE SVSTEK ALSO PROVIDES 
THE JUDICIARY AND THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES WITH POWER TO KEEP 
THE GOVERNOR IN BALANCE. 
GANN COULD SlGNIFlCANT~V CHANGE THIS BALANCE OF POWER BY 
SEVERELY LIMITING THE ABILITY OF THE LEGISLATURE TO REVIEW THE 
GOVERNOR'S PROPOSALS. THIS WOULD OCCUR THROUGH THE CUTBACK OF 
STAFFING AND FUNDING THAT THE PROPOSITION WOULD PURPORTEDlY 
BRJNG ABOUT. IN SO DOIN&~ PROPOSITION 24 WOULD HAMPER THE 
lEGISLATURE'S ABILITY TO PERFORM ITS CONSTITUTtON~ DUTIES. 
lET'S NOT FORGET THE PROPOSlTtON'S ATTEMPT TO CUT STAFFING 
AND FUNDINB BY FIAT REPRESENTS THE WORST KIND OF FISCAL MANAGE-
MENT. IT REFLECTS THE DECISION" TO MAK! CUTS WITHOUT FIRST 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THOSE CUTS. ANY HOMEMAKER COULD CUT A 
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BY I OR IGNORED THE FACT IT 
WOULD REQUIRE LV TO G NG FOR ONE WEEK PER MONTH. 
I NOTED AT OUTSET REMARKSA THE ISSUE OF PRO-
POSITION 24 IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO OUR SCHOOLS BECAUSE Of THE 
IMPORTANT ROlE THE LEGISLATURE PLAYS IN ALLOCATING FUNDING. 
EDUCATION IS THE SINGLE LARGEST ELEMENT Of THE STATE BUDGET6 RE-
PRESENTING APPROXIMAtELY 401. THAT BUDGET PROCESS REQUIRES GIVE 
AND TAKE AS EQUALS BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR AND TKE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH. 
OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO LOSE IF PROPOSITION 
24'S PROVlSlONS SHOULD BECOME LAW1 AND SO DOES THE HERITAGE OF 








Analysis of Proposition 24 
Rules, Procedures, Powers, Funding. 
Initiative Statute 
Proposition 24 would make significant 
structural, procedural, and budgetary changes 
in the California State Legislature. 
Specifically, the initiative would: 
• Restructure the composition and authority 
of the Senate, Assembly, and Joint Rules 
Committees and require a two-thirds vote 
for all major decisions. 
• Require committee assignments to be made by 
the party caucuses and require that commit~ 
tee seats be apportioned to reflect the 
partisan composition of the house. 
• Require all legislative funds, staff, and 
other resources to be allocated on a pro-
portional partisan basis. 
• Require each house to adopt its rules by 
a two-thirds vote and would codify rules 
regarding conference committees and voting 
procedures. 
• Reduce all funds appropriated for the sup-
port of the Legislature by an amount equal 
to 30% of the 1983-84 appropriations. 
• Freeze all subsequent budgets at the 1984-
85 level, adjusted only by increases or 
decreases in the State General Fund. 
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rect effect on 
30% reduction in 
islative Analyst 
11 result in a 
approximately 
The on the structure and 
operations Legislature is, of course, 
subject among the proponents and 
opponents of the measure. But it is likely 
that mandatory partisan disbursement of 
legislative funds, staff, committee 
assignments, and other resources would 
increase power of the party caucuses 
within Legislature. Concurrently, the 
dispersion of centralized authority and 
diminution of authority and power of 
legislat would contribute to the 









24 sponsored by Paul Gann, and 
known as the Gann Initiative. 
is also supported by Robert w. 
Republican Floor Leader, 
several members of his 
the drafting of the 
committee opposing 
the last Republican 
sembly, Robert Monagan. The 
opposed by the Democratic 
Legislature. 
Proposition 24 is 
ir allocation of 
and other resources; 
of r the 
, President 
to correct abuses 
s the public 








-3- Proposition 24 
spending has not increased disproportionately 
to the State General Fund; and that the 
measure is less an attempt to reform the 
Legislature as an effort by Republicans to 





KEENE'S GANN IN A NUTSHELL 
I. Questions about as 
A. Excessive 
B. Partisan domination? 
II. Constitutional questions 
A. Reduced funding v. 
1. Constitutional power to set rules and procedures 
2. Separation of powers 
B. Proposes rules not statute or constitutional amendments 
III. Policy questions 
A. Is minority veto consensus-defeating? 
B. Is partisanship increased? 
C. Does government become more or less open? 
D. Is power transferred elsewhere (i.e., courts, executive 
branch, bureaucracy, vested interests)? 
IV. Alleged deficiencies 
A. Misleading re-enactment of existing reforms 
B. Phantom spending cut 
C. Disenfranchisement of independents or third party 
c 
PROPOSITION at the request of Assembly 
Mountjoy) 
(a) All citizens of the State are entitled to full and 
eff.ective_ representation by eir elected representatives. 
(b) In recent years spendiriq for the aup~ort of the 
Legislature ba& increased at a rate greatly exceeding the growth 
in for most other. state functions, .. s~verely ~amaging 
the image and credibili of the Legislature with the people of 
California. 
(c In the absence of reasonable oversight and constraints, 
powerful individual lawmakers exercise virtually exclusive 
control over legislative spending, de ivinq the people of 
California and other lawmakers of an effective means of 
discoveri how these monies are being spent or of judging the 
riety of ose expenditures. 
' 
d The distribution of funding, staff, and informational 
reso ces n e Legislature accordi~g to predominantly p~rtis!n 
crite a h~s greatly hindered e ility of minority party 
represe a ives to provide effective legislative representation. 
(e) e concentration of er in the office of Spe~ke~ o! 
e Assemb y and, to a lesser extent, in the office o~ President 
pro Te e of the Senate ha~ created a system of patronage and 
n through ich a single legislator, accountable only to 
e le of a single legislative district, is able to wield 
9reatly disproportionate influence over the la~s of California. 
2) 
(f) The growt in 
a a its commi tee hal 
right o monitor e 
r resentat vea and re 
t 
sive voti practices in the Legislat~re 
rke to ~ p ve e people o: their 
rma e of e r legislat e 
d ac ordingly. 
eftual to a e to statut ry and (g) -.rhe Le 
trad tio al 
hearings and 
lie of its 
a cation qu1rementl for committee 
ference committees s de ived the 






'51 51< Street, Suite 600 
&lcrai'Mnto, CaWiornia 95814 
(9'16) 324·5437 
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D 3580 Wushire Boulevard, SUite 800 
los Angeles, Cakfomia 90010 
(213) 736-2273 
®ffke of !'±±nnte14 ®.en:eral 
. May 2, 1984 
Hon. Barry Keene 
Chairman 
Senate Judiciary Committee 
State Capitol, Room 2032 
Sacramento, California 
Hon. Elihu M. Harris 
Chairman 
John K. Van de Kamp 
Altomey General 
Assembly Judiciary Committee 
State Capitol, Room 6031 
Sacramento, California 
Dear Senator Keene and Assemblyman Harris: 
~~(b~o~q~IQJ 
MAY- 3 1984 
Pursuant to your request I offer these comments on the proposed 
Legislative Reform Act of 1983, the statutory initiative measure 
which will appear as Proposition 24 on the June primary election 
ballot. 
As you are aware I coauthored a part of the argument against 
Proposition 24 appearing in the official ballot pamphlet. My 
opposition represents my personal dissatisfaction with the 
measure on policy grounds; in the ballot argument I referred to 
the legal barriers the measure will have to hurdle if it passes. 
You have requested my legal view of the measure. In this regard 
the legal issues are quite clear. The answers are not. 
The proposed statutory. initiative would do two things. First, 
it would a~ter the parliamentary rules governing the conduct of 
legislative business. Second, it would limit the amount the 
Legislature could expend on legislative business. 
With respect to the first issue, the change in parliamentary 
rules, the proposed initiative would require that all such rules 
be adopted by two-thirds vote. This type of requirement, often 
called a "super majority," traditionally accords small factional 
interest groups power that is considerably disproportionate to 
their size. 
-174-
4 • . 
Senator Bar 
Assemblyman 
May 2, 1984 
Page 2 
Keene 
Elihu M. Harris 
Parliamentary rules are the heart of the legislative process 
and the to adopt such rules is expressly conferred on the 
Legislature by the California Constitution. Article IV, section 
7(a) of the California Constitution provides that each house of 
the Legislature "shall choose its officers and adopt rules for 
• its proceedings." For the most part, California's Legislature, 
as in other states and Congress, has for oyer 100 years adopted 
its parliamentary rules by majority vote of its members. 
The California Constitution authorizes the people to adopt 
"statutes and amendments to the constitution". (Calif. Const. 
Art. II, Sec. 8). While there is little doubt that the people, 
through initiative process, could amend their Constitution 
to ire the Legislature to adopt its rules by two-thirds 
vote, Pr ition 24 does not tender the people a 
constitutional initiative but a statutory initiative. 
As you know, a situation very similar to that posed by 
Proposition 24 arose in Massachusetts. The Supreme Court of 
Mas setts ld that the e had no power under the 
initiative ocess to enact rules for the Legislature under the 
guise o oposed statutory amendments. Paisner v. Attorney 
General. 
While of Massachusetts is in no way binding on the 
courts of is state, the proposition that constitutional 
powers can only be extinguished or modified by constitutional 
ts is not uni It is view that those portions of 
sition 24 which purport to impinge on the rule making 
of the Legislature are susceptible to constitutional 
may well be invali ted on same theory as 
ovisions were invalidated in Massachusetts. 
t to the other t of Proposition 24, that which 
s to 1 it amount whi may be expended by the 
islature on legislative business, it is questionable whether 
initiative statutory enactment can circumscribe the power of 
Legislature to appropriate funds for its own support. 
Clearly a constitutional amendment can impose limitations. The 
appr iation limitations contai in Article XIII B are an 
example of limitations imposed through an initiative 
constitutional amendment. 
At heart of this issue is the 
constitutionally, is acco 
the level of funding essential to 
-1 5-
tion of who, 
discretion to determine 
e conduct of legislative 
• 
Senator Barry Keene 
Assemblyman Elihu M. Harris 
May 2, 1984 
Page 3 
business. Can the people by statutory initiative totally deprive 
the Legislature of operating funds? If so could the people 
similarly deprive the courts of operating funds? Does the fact 
that Proposition 24 would merely limit, not eliminate, legislative 
funding render it valid? 
Existing legal authorities provide little guidance on this issue • 
It is a new issue that, ultimately, can only be resolved by the 
courts. It is interesting to note, however, that in the Paisner 
case the Massachusetts Supreme Court invalidated the entire 
initiative measure, notwithstanding a severability clause and 
notwithstanding the fact that some of the initiative's provisions 
were undoubtedly the proper subject of the initiative power. 
Whether the California courts would follow the same route, 
irrespective of whether the appropriation limitations are or are 
not the proper subject of a statutory initiative, is uncertain. 
Very truly yours, 
ac 
, 










ALFRED E. AlQUIST 
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Dear Chairmen: 
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST 
WILLIAM G. HAMM 
925 L STREET. SUITE 650 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814 
(916) 445-4656 
May 2, 1984 
You have asked us to respond to a series of questions concernino 
state finances and the Gann Initiative, which is Proposition 24 on the-June 
1984 ballot. This letter contains our responses. 
1. Over the last 16 years (1967-68 to 1983-84). what has been 
the qrowth in legislative expenditures compared to those for thP 
Governor's ~ffice and compared to total state General Fund expenditures? 
Response: Table 1 and Chart 1 show that: 
o Total General Fund expenditures increased by 592 percent over 
thi~ 16 year period. 
o Legislative expenditures increased by a slightly smaller 
percentage--namely 583 percent. 
o Ry contrast, expenditures for the Governor's office increased by 
7Z~ percent. 
The definition of legislative _expenditures reflected in these 
displays is- that used by the Gann Initiative. It includes not only the 
Assembly, Senate, and Joint expenses, but also the expenses of the 
Legislative Counsel, the California Law Revision Commission, and the 
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million. This is t~e 
support appropriations that 
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ired cut as being "up to $37 
million. is is because we cannot 
appropriations cited in Table 2 are 
11 For example: 
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the Auditor General's budget 
seal audits. The primary 
ich are required by statute, are to: 
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California Revision Commission 420 
Commission on ifonn State Laws 51 
Total ~123,485c 
Excludes $7,674,000 of special fund expenditures, and $554,000 of 
General Fund joint printi expenses because both will be funded out 
of rri0r year appropriations. 
b. The Leaislative Counsel's budget i icates $17,000 of unidentified 
savings. Because Proposi on 24 is an appropriation limit, these 
savings were disregarded when calculating the limit and as a result 
the figure in this table is $17,000 gher than the one shown in 
Schedule 9. 
c. An unknown portion appropriations 
support of the Legislature. As a result, this 
maximum potential base on which the 30 percent 
calculated. 
-1 
not be for the direct 
total represents the 
reduction would be 
. Barry Keene May 2, 1984 
Hon. ihu M. Harris 
Unfortuna y, proposition 24 does not define the key term 
"expenditures in support of the I egislature.'' Without knowing how this 
phrase would be in t estima we could make of the cut 
that would be requi $37 million." 
Sincerely, 




SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF 
ROBERT C. POST 
BEF<:RE A JOINT HEARING OF THE 
SENATE AND ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY CCMMITTEES 
Senate and Assembly 
Judiciary Committees on May 4, , I was requested by 
EXHIBIT F 
Senator Ollie Speraw to supplement my remarks by reaching 
conclusions respecting the constitutionality of 
provisions of the Gann Initiative. Chairman Keene indicated that 
he would keep the record open to receive this supplemental 
analysis. 
I subsequently received a letter from Marilyn R. Riley, 
counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, asking me on behalf of 
Senator Speraw to "analyze each section of Proposition 24 to 
determine its consti tutionali , " with particular attention to 
"the effect of Section 9906, the severability clause." 
Senator Speraw's would strain the resources of a 
large law firm, and it certainly raises issues that transcend the 
meagre resources presently available to me. Nevertheless, I will 
in this supplemental statement do my best to shed what light I 
can on these issues. 
I. THE GANN INITIATIVE: ARTICLE 2. -- --- ---"-..._,.;....;:.._.;.;;.,... ......;;.....;;...;;;...;:..;;:;.;;;;. 
In my original testimony I concluded that the California 
Constitution was inconsistent th those aspects of the Gann 
Initiative which the abi ty of either house of the 
legislature to adopt rules for its internal proceedings or to 
select committees necessary for the conduct of its business. 





Sections 9914 tiative create the offices 
of the Speaker of Assembly and the President pro tempore of 
the Senate. Each office is charged th the 11efficient conduct of 
the legislative and administrative affairs" of its respective 
house. Section 9913 subjects appointments made by the Speaker "to 
confirmation by the Assembly Corrmittee on Rules." 
The offices of Speaker and President pro tempore, together 
with 
of 
those offices respecting the internal 
rules of the 
traditionally been a matter 
1 
ifornia legislature. The 









9910, 9913 and 9914 impair the ability of the 
Assembly to structure their internal proceedings 
, they are 
li to enact rules inconsistent with 
3 
tutional. 
, Rules 19-23 (1911) ; 
); Senate XLV (1854); Senate Rules 
Senate Rules 2, 6, 7, 8 (1966); Senate Rules 2, 
Rule 7 (1850); Assembly Rule 20 (1867); Assembly 
; Assembly Rules 12, 26(e) (1983). 
, however, I 
may be 
Code. 
not when enacted 
-1 
tracks that of Section 
At pages 6 to 9 of my 
why statutes governing 
when enacted by the 









II. THE INITIATIVE 
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with matters of 
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9925 of the 
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, 20, 26(e) 
Senate 
. 2 (1965); 
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rulemaking, as well as with how committees are to be established 
and their members selected For reasons previously discussed, 
these provisions are unconstitutional. 
The remainder of Article 3 essentially recodifies the 
present Grunsky-Burton Open Meeting Act. Analysis of these 
provisions is complicated by Section 7(c) of Article IV of the 
state Constitution, which provides: 
The proceedings of each house and the committees thereof 
shall be public except as provided by statute or by 
concurrent resolution, when such resolution is adopted by a 
two-thirds vote of the members of each house, provided, that 
if there is a conflict between such statute and concurrent 
resolution, the last adopted shall prevail. 
s the Gann Initiative cannot be amended except "by statute, 
passed in each house by rollcall vote entered in the journal, 
two-thirds of the membership concurring and signed by the 
Governor," the open meeting provisions of the Initiative 
deprive the legislature of its constitutional power to meet 
secretly it chooses to do so by concurrent resolution. For 
5 
this reason the are unconstitutional. 
III. THE ~~ INITIATIVE: ARTICLE 4. 
4 of the Ini deals with legislative funding 
and its administration. It raises difficult and far-ranging 
issues of law. Resolution of these issues is for the most part 
beyond the scope of the time and information available to me. But 
I will try to be as as I can, and, where appropriate, I 
will try to isolate pertinent questions of fact and law. 
5 
As discussed in note 3, supra, a statute can be constitutional 
when enacted by the legislature, but unconstituitonal when 
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house. Thus Sections 9126 and 9127 of the present Government 
Code, enacted in 1949, provide that the Assembly and Senate 
contingent funds "shall be disbursed • • • as provided in the 
7 
rules, orders, and resolutions" of each house. The Gann 
Initiative itself recognizes that such disbursements are 
primarily a matter of the internal proceedings of each house, and 
the Initiative accordingly attempts to create the internal rules 
by which such disbursements will occur. I would conclude, 
therefore, that those provisions of the Initiative impairing the 
ability of each house to govern its own disbursements are 
unconstitutional. 
B. Sections 9935, 9936, and 9937. 
Section 9935 concerns the technical accounting matters 
associated with the initial creation of the contingent funds. For 
the reasons given in the first paragraph of Section III(A), 
supra, I it to be constitutional. 
9936 and impose certain accounting and 
reporting duties on specific legislative committees. On the one 
provisions constrain the legislature's power to 
lities to those ttees. On the other hand, the 
created by these provisions seem to concern public 
accountability rather than internal procedures. 
As far as I have been able to discern, these sections codified 
practice. See, ~~ Senate Rules 12, 37 (1911). 
More research reTains to be done on this question, however, 






















For these reasons, if the funding cuts mandated by Section 
9934 were to tmpair the ability of the legislature to function as 
a co-equal branch of government, a serious constitutional 
question would be raised pursuant to the principle of the 
separation of powers. 
Whether the funding cuts do so impair the legislature is a 
question of fact, and I do not presently have available to me the 
evidence necessary for its resolution. It is fair to say, however, 
that, given the language of the Initiative, I would view any such 
claim of impairment with some skepticism. 
2. Severability. 
If the analysis in my testimony is correct, most of the 
provisions of the Gann Initiative are unconstitutional. Indeed, 
Articles 2 through 4 of the Initiative contain 27 sections, of 
which 23 are in some manner unconstitutional. 
This raises in its sharpest form the question of whether the 
Initiative will be struck down in toto. The Initiative, of 
course, contains a severability provision, Section 9906, which 
provides: 
If any provision of this chapter, or the application of 
any such provision to any person or circumstances, shall be 
held invalid, the remainder of this chapter, to the extent 
it can be given effect, or the application of such provision 
to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it 
is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby, and to this 
the provisions of this chapter are severable. 
Assuming, then, that Section 9934 is otherwise constitutional, 
the question is whether it will be preserved by Section 9906 




Although courts will normally 
of the continued 
'(it] complete in i 
legislative body had the latter 
of the statute' (In re __ , (1942) 
'constitutes a completely ""'""'""'"" 
to 
of the 
intent ••• [and is not] so connected with rest of the 
statute as to be inseparable." (In :re Portnoy, Cal.2d 
237, 242) ."Santa Barbara Sch. Dist.:!..:.. Superior Court, .3d 
315, 331 (1975). 
determination of legislative intent 
with respect to an initiative. It a fine 
how relevant 
discovered. Aids to 
summary prepared by the 
mass of electors can be 
of this intent 
general n and "the 
and against the measure sent to the voters and set 
pamphlets accompanying the the sample ballots." Carter v. 
Seaboard Finance Co., 33 .2d 564, 580-81 (1949). Also 
pertinent would be campaign literature on both 
I have available the Attorney 's summary, 
not helpful in this context. I have not seen the n~rnnh 
it is 
accompanying the sample 
campaign literature. It 
, and I do not access to 
extremely difficult for me to 
reach an informed judgment on this 
On the one , there not to 
or logical connection between Section 9934 and the rest of the 
-193-
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Initiative. One can envision a voter having two distinct and 
independent goals: (1) reducing legislative spending; and 
(2) restructing the internal proceedings of the legislature. Even 
if the second goal were found to be unconstitutional, the first 
could continue unabated. From this perspective, then, the 
severability clause should protect Section 9934. 
On the other hand, the text of the Initiative reveals some 
interdependence between these two goals. In Section 99!3l(a), in 
what is clearly the foundation of its subsequent provisions, the 
Initiative 11finds and declares": "All citizens of the State are 
entitled to full and effective representation by their elected 
representatives. 11 In Section 990l(d) the Initiative declares that 
insufficient legislative funding can seriously impair such "full 
and effective representation." It finds that "the distribution of 
funding, staff, and informational resources in the Legislature 
according to predominantly partisan criteria has greatly hindered 
the ability of minority party representatives to provide 
effective legislative representation." 
If the provisions of the Initiative that guarantee the 
minority party of the legislature a proportional share of 
8 
legislative disbursements were struck down as unconstitutional, 
and if Section 9934 were upheld, it follows that the 30% cut in 
legislative funding would drain the minority party of 
"funding, staff and informational resources" to an extent not 
8 
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